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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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the PHS's Division of Water Supply and Pollution Control.

## STEPS NECESSARY

The first step, he points out, is to clean up the tributaries that are carrying nutrient-rich sewage and industrial wastes into the waters of the lake. This would slow down the aging acceleration, but that is about all.

The second step would be to maintain the water quality at present levels.

This would mean cutting down as much as possible on the nitrogen and phosphorus going into the water. Sewage treatment would have to be stepped up—at one-quarter to one-half over present costs—to remove nutrients. Studies have shown phosphorus is the principal culprit, Coulter said.

A repair job—perhaps lasting 10 years—would involve dredging out bottom sediment high in phosphates and isolating those wastes in land dumps. It would involve harvesting of crops of algae and aquatic growths. It would involve massive catches of the "rough" fish in the lake, whose bodies contain phosphorus.

It would cost money, but it can be done.

#### PARTICIPATION OF NEW HAMPSHIRE CLERGY IN THE NATIONAL CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, as a Senator from the State of New Hampshire, I have taken a great deal of pride at the active participation of members of the New Hampshire clergy in the national civil rights movement.

In particular, I have been very pleased with the courageous participation of representative members of the New Hampshire clergy in the recent march from Selma, Ala., to Montgomery.

It seems to me that these men have followed their unquestioned responsibilities as men of God, concerned with the treatment of their fellow man.

There were many issues at stake in Selma. Some of them, such as the right of American citizens to vote, are issues which are properly the concern of every American, and specifically the concern of the Congress. So it is with the issue of man's treatment of his fellow man. This, too, is an area of concern to all humanity, but it is more specifically an area of immediate concern to all our clergy.

Thus, as religious leaders from all America, from all sects and denominations, came to Alabama last month, they, too, were doing their duty in a way which I must commend. And it was truly with pride and appreciation that I learned that clergymen from New Hampshire were among them.

There are those today who say that the clergy had no place in Alabama. These people, whom I frankly suspect of no higher motive than the stirring up of mischief for their own personal gratification, have singled out members of the New Hampshire clergy in their attacks.

Mr. President, I know of no more unfounded attacks than these. They would have the clergy take the stand of Cain, who claimed that he was not his brother's keeper. But the propriety, the correctness, the essential morality of the clergy in this context stands as its own defense. I can only add my own respect and support.

#### JOB CORPS CENTERS FOR WOMEN

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, one of the projects of the Government's war-on-poverty program is the establishment of Job Corps centers for women. The purpose of these residential centers is to provide young women between the ages 16 and 21, many of whom are school dropouts, with instruction in basic education, vocational training, home and family life, and citizenship responsibility.

Thus far, contracts totaling \$8½ million have been awarded by the Office of Economic Opportunity for the establishment of the first three women's centers. Ultimately 25 centers will be set up to accommodate 6,500 young women.

The groups operating the centers will receive \$530 a month to feed, house, and give instruction to each girl. The OEO will also give each young woman and her family an allowance of \$105 a month. This adds up to \$635 a month or \$7,620 a year. In addition, the OEO will pay transportation costs estimated at \$75 to \$100 per girl.

It may be wondered why it costs the taxpayers almost \$8,000 a year per young woman to operate these Government job centers when a girl can be sent to any one of the country's leading colleges for the academic year at a cost of less than one-half that amount and to a State institution of learning at a cost of less than one-fourth that amount.

In my opinion, the expenditure of nearly \$8,000 a year to train a young woman in reading, writing, mathematics, how to manage money, and to become a capable mother and citizen is completely out of reason and beyond the realm of justification even by the most ingenious mind and the most extravagantly disposed person. I simply cannot understand it.

If the general program is good, the spending of \$8,000 a year to train a dropout cannot be justified.

I find this newest expenditure of the taxpayers' money even more fantastic when consideration is given to the fact that at a cost of almost \$32 billion in fiscal year 1964, the Federal Government is already involved in 42 individual programs designed to combat and overcome the causes of poverty. And for the same year an additional \$35.9 billion was expended by State and local governments on social welfare activities, including education.

A further weakness in this program is that a volunteer may drop out anytime she wishes. The dropout rate of the manpower program for 1964 was about 33 percent, and authorities feel that this figure is a reliable estimate of the dropout rate for programs of this nature. To what good use have these Job Corps "dropouts" put the taxpayers' money?

In conclusion, Mr. President, I cannot emphasize too strongly my opposition to the establishment by the Federal Government of the women's Job Corps for the following reasons:

First. It is an outrageously expensive program.

Second. The Federal Government is already involved in 42 programs designed

Third. It is another glaring example of the Federal Government usurping State and local authority and taking over their duties.

Fourth. There is no guarantee that volunteers will not drop out before completing the training program.

#### THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, every day the crisis in Vietnam appears to grow worse. We are concerned about its acceleration. I have been supporting the program and the policy of the President on the ground that constitutionally he is responsible for the day-to-day conduct of our foreign affairs. I have great confidence in his wisdom, capacity, and understanding with respect to these complicated matters.

Nevertheless, there is another point of view, and I believe that point of view should be carefully considered.

Accordingly, I ask unanimous consent that two excellent recent columns written by Walter Lippmann, one published in the Washington Post of March 30, and the other in the Washington Post of April 1, be printed in chronological order at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Mar. 30, 1965]

TODAY AND TOMORROW—ON THE WAY TO THE BRINK

(By Walter Lippmann)

The war in Vietnam has reached the point where the President is wrestling with momentous and fateful decisions. For what has happened is that the official theory of the war, as propounded by Gen. Maxwell Taylor to President Kennedy and by Secretary McNamara to President Johnson, has proved to be unworkable. The government in Saigon has not been able to pacify South Vietnam even with the help of American munitions, money, and 25,000 military advisers. The crucial fact today is that for all practical purposes the Saigon government has lost control of the countryside, and its followers are increasingly holed up in the cities.

The roads and the railroads connecting the cities have been cut by the Vietcong. The cities now have to be supplied in great measure by air and by sea. This condition of affairs has been well reported by Mr. Richard Dudman in a series of reports to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and his findings are confirmed in all essentials, though not yet publicly, in the well-informed quarters in Washington.

The surest evidence that Mr. Dudman's reports are substantially correct is that in the Pentagon and the State Department there is mounting pressure for the commitment to southeast Asia of American infantry. The current estimate is that the President should be prepared to send 350,000 American soldiers, even though this would compel him to order a mobilization of Reservists and draftees.

This call for American ground forces is the logical and inevitable consequence of the virtual collapse of the Saigon government in the villages. Having lost the countryside, Saigon has lost the sources of military manpower. This deprives it of the means for winning the war. The official estimates today are that the Saigon government commands forces superior to the Vietcong by a ratio of not less than 10 to 1. Yet it is clear that no guer-

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rilla war has ever been subdued with such a low ratio of superiority. It is estimated that in Malaya, the British and the Malaysians, who were fighting the indigenous Chinese guerrillas, reached a superiority of 50 to 1. In Cyprus, which they gave up, the British had overwhelming force. In Algeria, though the French Army had unmistakable superiority, the country became untenable. It is the deficiency in South Vietnamese military manpower which explains why the pressure is now on to put in Americans to fill it.

After 2 months of bombing North Vietnam, it has become manifest also that the bombing has not changed the course of the war. As a result of this disappointment, the President is now under pressure to extend the bombing to the populated centers around Hanoi and Haiphong.

There is no doubt that American air power can devastate North Vietnam and, if China intervened, could do great damage in China. But if we had an American Army of 350,000 men in South Vietnam, and extended the war in the air, we would have on our hands an interminable war without the prospect of a solution. To talk about freedom and national independence amidst such violence and chaos would be to talk nonsense.

In order to rationalize, that is to sell, the wider war, we are being told by Secretary McNamara and others that this war is a decisive test for the future. It will decide the future of "wars of liberation." This is a profoundly and dangerously false notion, and it shows a lamentable lack of knowledge and understanding of the revolutionary upheavals of the epoch in which we live. It assumes that revolutionary uprisings against established authority are manufactured in Peking or in Moscow, and that they would not happen if they were not incited, supported, and directed from one of the capitals of communism. If this were true, the revolutionary movements could be suppressed once and for all by knocking out Peking or Moscow. They little know the hydra who think that the hydra has only one head and that it can be cut off.

Experience shows that there is no single central source of the revolutionary upheavals of our epoch. What is there that is common to the Irish rebellion, to the Jewish uprising in Palestine, to the civil war in Cuba, to the Arab rebellion in Algeria, to the Huk revolt in the Philippines? What is common to them all is violent discontent with the established order and a willingness of a minority of the discontented to die in the attempt to overthrow it.

What has confused many well-meaning Americans is that in some of these rebellions, though not by any means in all of them, Communists have become the leaders of the rebellion. But that does not mean that they have owned the rebellion. The resistance to the Nazis in France and Italy contained a high proportion of Communists among the active partisans. But 20 years later it is General de Gaulle who presides over France.

It would be well to abandon the half-baked notion that the war in southeast Asia will be decisive for the future of revolutionary upheavals in the world. Revolution is a homegrown product, and it could not be stamped out decisively and once for all—supposing we had such delusions of grandeur—by stamping out Red China. In southeast Asia we have entangled ourselves in one of the many upheavals against the old regime, and we shall not make things any better by thrashing around with ascending violence.

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 1, 1965]  
TODAY AND TOMORROW—THE BASIS OF  
NEGOTIATION

(By Walter Lippmann)

The cardinal defect of the administration's conduct of the war in Indochina has been

pointed out by a Republican Senator JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, of Kentucky. In a statement last week (March 25), Senator Cooper said that the U.S. Government, like its adversaries in Peking and Hanoi, is "prescribing conditions as a prerequisite to negotiations which will not be accepted." The Communists are making it a condition of a negotiation that the United States must withdraw from Vietnam; we are making it a condition of a negotiation that North Vietnam must withdraw from South Vietnam. This is, said Senator Cooper, "a kind of demand from both sides for unconditional surrender."

It is, therefore, highly important that the administration put itself in a position where negotiation is possible, granting that even if it did so, Hanoi and Peking may gamble on winning the war in order to overrun South Vietnam and inflict a smashing defeat on the United States. But regardless of what they do, we must come into court with clean hands. The administration needs to clarify its own position—in order to set in motion a movement for negotiation and, failing that, to put the onus of prolonging and widening the war unmistakably on our adversaries.

There is a mistaken impression in this country that we are ready and willing to negotiate but that the other side is imposing intolerable conditions; namely, that we should withdraw our forces before the negotiation begins. Senator Cooper rejects the Communist condition, as do all of us who have been actively interested in this question. We cannot withdraw our forces until there has been a political settlement in Indochina, a settlement which promises to last because it serves the primary interests of all concerned.

But what, as a matter of fact, is our position? It is that before negotiations can take place, the North must demonstrate its readiness "to leave its neighbors alone." Secretary Rusk has avoided a precise definition of that phrase. We know that "illegal infiltration of military personnel and arms" is considered to violate that condition. That "leaving your neighbors alone" means also withdrawal of infiltrators who are already there has at times been suggested but never formally stated.

Senator Cooper says of this position: "I think it unlikely that the Communists will agree to this condition for negotiations, as we will not agree to their condition that the United States withdraw."

What Senator Cooper is asking the administration to do is what was done in the Korean war: "no such conditions were imposed by either side prior to negotiations, but a cease-fire was sought." Until the administration comes around to this position, its diplomacy will be confused.

Last week (March 25) the President issued a statement that "we have said many times—to all who are interested in our principles for honorable negotiation—that we seek no more than a return to the essentials of the agreements of 1954—a reliable arrangement to guarantee the independence and security of all in southeast Asia."

This is rather puzzling. The agreements of 1954 were reached at Geneva in a conference in which there participated not only the Indochinese states but also Russia, Red China, Britain, France, and the United States. The agreements ended the fighting between the French Union forces and the Vietminh in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. These states were to become independent countries, with Vietnam partitioned at the 17th parallel into two zones pending general "free elections" to be held by January 20, 1956.

The cease-fire agreement was signed by the military commanders. But in addition, the General Secretaries of the Government of North Vietnam, dated July 21. This declaration con-

tained the following principles of settlement. One of the principles was that the cease-fire prohibited the "introduction into Vietnam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions." The Geneva declaration went on to say that "the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary." Furthermore, the declaration said that "general elections shall be held in July 1956 under the supervision of an international commission."

The United States did not sign the final declaration. But the Under Secretary of State, Gen. Bevel Smith, made a "unilateral declaration" which said that the United States supported the agreements and that "in connection with the statement in the declaration concerning free elections in Vietnam, my Government wishes to make clear its position which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954, as follows: 'In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly.'"

The United States encouraged the Diem government in Saigon to refuse to hold the elections of 1956, almost certainly for the quite practical reason that they would have been won by the Communists.

Considering the essentials of the 1954 agreements, it is not easy to understand what it means to say now that "we seek no more than a return to the essentials of the agreements of 1954." I am afraid it means that in the diplomatic conduct of the war in Vietnam, the diplomats have not been doing their homework.

#### THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMUNIST GIANTS

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed at this point in the Record a lecture delivered by Hon. George F. Kennan, at Princeton University, on February 25, 1965. The lecture is entitled "The United States and the Communist Giants."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this lecture may be printed in ordinary type, not in small, most unreadable type in which insertions are usually printed.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There being no objection, the lecture was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMUNIST GIANTS

"(By the Honorable George F. Kennan, Walter E. Edge Lecture, Princeton University, Feb. 25, 1965)

"When the invitation to deliver this lecture reached me, some months ago, and I was obliged, according to established custom, to select a title for a lecture I had not yet even thought about, the one selected was the one you see on the program this evening: 'The United States and the Communist Giants.' What I had in mind, in selecting this title, was a relatively detached and relaxed discourse on the nature of the three great powers: Russia, China, and the United States, at this historical juncture, an examination of their respective ideologies and the compulsions that most of their governments, and perhaps the hazarding of some specula-

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the public. If we give them the information and spell out the public's stake in good corrections, we may well discover that they're far ahead of us in accepting new approaches in corrections. The Huber law, under which jail inmates work in the community and return to the jail at night, is fully accepted in Wisconsin. When the public understands the issues involved, they are intrigued with the human approaches and will insist upon them. In North Carolina the new kind of program which places a thousand working inmates in the community each day is accepted editorially by every newspaper in the State. I am coming to believe that the old saw that "we can't move very far ahead of the public" is a delusion and is perpetuated by many of us in corrections as an alibi for our own failures to get on with the job which the future demands.

#### LIBERALIZATION OF VETERANS PENSION LIMITATIONS—RESOLUTION

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, a most thoughtful and important resolution was recently adopted by Maco Steward Post No. 20 of the American Legion, Galveston, Tex. In order that this matter may be more fully understood by other Senators, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Whereas existing legislation (sec. 503 of title 38, United States Code) sets limits on war veterans' incomes for eligibility to draw the veterans pension well below the "poverty" level now recognized as a basis for economic opportunity needs;

Whereas many pensioners and annuitants, because of the poverty income level set by existing law, are not eligible to enjoy the benefits of cost-of-living increases granted to an individual under public or private retirement, annuity, endowment or similar type plans or programs, and some veterans must either forgo or waive such paid-in benefits as those offered under certain public or private retirement plans; and

Whereas veterans with only the small pension for support find themselves in utterly dire circumstances and are all but humiliated by a government pledged to give reasonable recognition for services rendered in the interest of national security: Be it

Resolved, That either the aforementioned income limitations be raised to more reasonable levels, so as to remove the "poverty" penalty and stigma, or that a law be enacted by the Congress to amend section 503 of title 38 of the United States Code to exclude from consideration as income for the purpose of determining pension eligibility, all amounts paid to an individual under public or private retirement, annuity, endowment, or similar type plans or programs. (Attention is invited to H.R. 5677 already offered and scheduled for study by the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. It is recommended that this bill be amended to afford relief for veterans who are ineligible for retirement pay under programs other than the pension legislation.)

C. E. BLAKEMAN,  
Commander.  
THAD A. LAW,  
Adjutant.

The above resolution was adopted by this post on March 18, 1965, at a regular meeting of this post.

#### REAPPORTIONMENT OF THE STATE LEGISLATURES

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, a well-known and respected columnist, Doris Fleson, has written a revealing article concerning the current effort to stop the reapportionment of both houses of the State legislatures on the basis of population.

With her usual no-nonsense approach, Miss Fleson has dug into the core of the proposals to reverse the Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th amendment require that each citizen's vote not only count, but count equally, in both houses of his State legislature. She points out, correctly, that Congress gives the appearance of having one hand not know what the other is doing: while Congress appears intent on enforcing the constitutional right of Negroes to register and to vote, through the new Voting Rights Act, a large number of its Members appear anxious to permanently deprive Negroes and many other citizens of the constitutional right to have their vote count equally with that of other citizens.

This article should be widely read. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the article, entitled "Efforts To Blunt the Urban Vote," from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch of March 30, 1965, be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### DORIS FLESON—EFFORTS TO BLUNT THE URBAN VOTE

WASHINGTON.—A Senate preparing to pass a voting rights bill with a whoop and a holler is simultaneously engaged in wrapping up a stupendous lollipop for the status quo not only in the South but all over the country.

It will cut down the value of the Negro's vote when he gets it together with that of other minorities and all the voters who cram the urban areas where 85 percent of Americans now live. This will be the effect, and not very heavily disguised intent, of the sweetmeat which will nullify the Supreme Court's "one man, one vote" ruling of June 15, 1964.

A constitutional amendment wrapper has been fixed upon, and a judiciary subcommittee on such moves is holding hearings on what form it should take. However, the yes votes were there at the start in that citadel of conservatism of which Senator James EASTLAND is chairman.

The central structure embraces the principle that States should be permitted to apportion one house of their legislatures on a basis other than population. This immense latitude is qualified by the proviso that a majority of the people must vote for the change. How this would work out in practice is unclear.

The project, and especially the timing, is again from the hand of the old master, Republican leader EVERETT DIRKSEN. DIRKSEN is at the peak of his popularity for his civil rights services. President Johnson's close relations with him in the practice of consensus lend him a helpful coloration in the matter of prestige.

DIRKSEN has a valid and 100 percent Republican reason for his efforts. His party's rural roots are vital to its power in many

States, including New York. That is why the liberal Senator JACOB JAVITS is going along part of the way.

Also, DIRKSEN senses the need for haste even on such a large and significant question. The battle to get fair reapportionment by the Court's standard has hardly been joined. As it progresses, if it is allowed to, the public's understanding of what is at stake will mount. This is especially true of the civil rights forces, who stand to gain the most under the voting rights bill which now preoccupies them.

There are many extraordinary aspects of the Senate's haste to fall in line behind DIRKSEN's banner.

The big States with their great cities are the base of the Democratic Party's strength and must continue to be. The topheavy majorities that they have enabled the party to gain in Congress seem to have no place in the thinking of Senate Democratic Leader MIKE MANSFIELD, who once more is prepared to swing along with his opposition leader.

Really staggering, however, is the Senate's near-total indifference to the true condition of the State legislatures in today's world. Even casual readers of newspapers must observe their many internal weaknesses. Experts have come to question their capacity to deal with new and complex questions.

Their conflicts of interest are a cliché. These arise out of the poor support they get from home as well as their poor pay.

It would appear that the Senate should be welcoming the winds of change to air the stale legislative chambers and give the States a better chance. Instead, it seems bent on defending the indefensible, and it is a charge upon the whole Senate to explore what is really being defended.

#### FREEDOM ACADEMY SUPPORT PYRAMIDING

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, recently the Atlanta Constitution editorially sought reason for the decline in the strategic position of the United States in southeast Asia. Editors of the paper view our air strikes in North Vietnam as evidencing our ineptitude in the type of warfare we have faced there, causing policymakers to shore up our position by resort to quite a different type warfare—one in which we excel. But these editors warn that in order to realize our policy goals in Asia, we have still to solve the fundamental problem: How to win in nonmilitary warfare.

We may win battles in the name of peoples, but unless we win the peoples themselves they will go their own way regardless of how the battles went. Most South Vietnamese care little about ideological terms like communism and democracy. They'll go with the government that offers them the best system for meeting their own needs.

It is more clearly stated. The Atlanta Constitution identifies the area of our weakness:

Bombing may end the shooting, but the Vietcong may win the war. If our counter-insurgency effort in South Vietnam was insufficient, then we must value the lessons learned and perfect the system, not overlook the lessons and abandon the system.

Our failure in Vietnam has been primarily political, not military, and superficial bombing cannot erase the need for some long-range learning on the part of the United States. Political effectiveness must accompany it, or the decisions will be un-

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the applicant's probabilities of parole adjustment based on behavior attitudinal changes and accomplishments within the institution.

He will probably be released without any real preparation for the job secured for him and placed under the supervision of a parole officer whom he has never seen before and who on the first contact makes sure the releasee is fully aware of the fact that he can be sent back for any of a whole series of violations, many of which are ludicrous in a contemporary society. Or he may, on the other hand have spent part time during the last few months in the institution attending prerelease meetings, may have met his parole officer and may have found in that officer, a counselor, a friend and guide.

But the very real probability is that beginning with arrest through the jail until final release from probation or parole, he will have had an experience which reflects nothing of a continuous, meaningful, supervision and experience. All too little of his experiences will have been with anyone except other offenders and officers of the court or institution. He will have very little feeling that he has undergone a kind of social process in which he has relationships with normal people leading normal lives in a normal community. With few exceptions, we have a long way to go in this country to create, develop, and administer a continuous correctional process which is designed to retrain, redevelop, and create maximum impact toward social adjustment of offenders.

When I referred earlier to the need for research and development I perhaps sounded a little too academic and you may well have wondered: Can we really apply the principle of research and development to corrections? I think so. If a correctional administrator genuinely and seriously wants to determine the extent to which his system is succeeding or failing in reaching accepted goals then he needs research. He will then want to determine whether more effective techniques, methods and programs can be designed than those which have been traditionally used. This means setting up new kinds of approaches and measuring the results against those which have been traditionally used. This may apply to a wide range of program elements. It may mean a complete reexamination of the philosophy on which traditional approaches have been based. Results of self-study, and research, and demonstration projects may, in turn, have tremendous impact upon modifying, revising, and changing the philosophy of correctional administration.

What new kinds of development can we foresee? Let's examine together for a moment one recent major development in corrections: a rising interest in the halfway house. Community groups—including several religious organizations—saw the need for a bridge between institutions and the community. Halfway houses were established in a number of cities including Los Angeles; Chicago; Minneapolis; Wilmington, Del.; St. Louis; and others. These took a variety of forms from small family residential units to larger come-one-come-all programs. An institution in New York State for delinquent girls developed several halfway houses which were in reality residential facilities within a city supplementing the residential programs at the institution.

In our Federal correctional system, we now have four prerelease guidance centers for youthful offenders, in New York, Detroit, Los Angeles, and Chicago. A fifth will open this spring here in Washington, D.C.

I believe the halfway house concept should be extended to selected adult prisoners, now that it has proven its worth among youthful offenders.

Another imaginative new program that I believe would prove successful for Federal prisoners is a work-release program.

to those employed in such State systems as Wisconsin and North Carolina. This plan was conceived as the Huber law in Wisconsin. Under the plan, penitentiary inmates are employed outside the prison during the day, after suitability has been determined by staff evaluation.

In a visit to North Carolina last year, I learned that of 10,000 prisoners committed to the North Carolina prison system, nearly 1,000 work under this work-release program, paying expenses for board and room at the prison, supporting families, sometimes saving money and maintaining and developing skills. Transfers from institutions to the community become almost a paper transaction.

The entire State of North Carolina, as represented by newspaper editorials, accepts and is extremely proud of its development. I learned recently that California is now creating an extensive work-release program. In this kind of change we can foresee changes in philosophy as the result of evaluation and demonstration projects which may well pinpoint a revolution in our field.

Professor Glaser's study of inmates released from Federal institutions which has been carried on for the past 5 years under a grant from the Ford Foundation, is resulting in revision of institutional programs in the Federal system. All of us are acquainted with the California research on probation officer caseloads, on intensive parole supervision, in administration. Although I cite only a few examples, I hope they are perceptible as indexes of the kind of correctional administration which can produce planned change.

The need for completely new concepts of management in personnel training and development is becoming abundantly clear. I suggested earlier that we are inclined to think we have a good correctional institution if we have an experienced warden and some staff people who have been trained in the behavioral sciences. But thus far, our training of line personnel—that is the people who have the regular day to day contacts with institution inmates—is restricted usually to not more than high school graduation. In service training is devoted primarily to correctional skills such as counts, locks, locking devices, use of gas, riot plans, escape plans. Yet these are the people who deal most directly and have the greatest impact upon the inmates of our institutions. Because of the compelling need for this kind of training, our center at Southern Illinois University is designing a subprofessional training curriculum for correctional officers. Briefly, this is planned to be a 2-year subprofessional curriculum, designed to instill insights and understandings from the behavioral sciences and some skills in dealing with behavior problems. We can't possibly insist that every correctional worker must have a college degree. As a matter of fact, unemployed youth and young adults can be remotivated and given training for jobs in corrections. This will elevate the base competence of the whole body of correctional personnel.

Moreover, we need extended and continuous training in public administration for our administrators. We need training at the supervisory level and continuous development of people working in the behavioral disciplines. It is from this kind of philosophy of personnel administration that we can accelerate the evolution of corrections.

Finally, I have spoken of our failure to use community resources. All too often we think that in corrections we can't get on with the job unless we have all the staff needed on our immediate payroll. This simply isn't true. A new trend to build correctional institutions in close proximity to universities is a case in point. Universities offer training in corrections which have been used all too

rarely and all too little in years gone by; and yet, in terms of personnel training and development, research in the behavioral sciences and consulting services in sociology, in education, in special education, and vocational training are available in the larger universities. This conference is evident of the fact that universities are available as resources for correctional development.

But beyond this there are available a wide variety of other resources. Talent can be brought into the institution from the community. Inmates can be taken from the institutions into the community for purposes other than a work-release program. I need only mention League of Women Voters, or women's clubs, various professional societies who are always willing to help in public institutions; libraries, recreation associations and so on through a long list of community resources which we have rarely attempted to use. In probation and parole, I like these recent experimental programs which bring small groups of probationers and parolees together under the guidance of psychologists and group therapists, or skilled probation officers who can discuss with a group their common problems. This I think will one day lead to the development of new kinds of community correctional facilities based right in the community as contrasted to our present jails and prisons all too often off in some far part of the community or the State. Yes, we must look to the use of community resources in a way never dreamed of up to this time.

I am convinced that one of our serious mistakes is to try to rehabilitate everyone. We extend the same processes, procedures, and programs to all. I get a little weary sometimes of going to large penitentiaries and seeing old, recidivistic offenders being given vocational training, education, and the gamut of our treatment processes for the third, fourth, or fifth time. Now this is a little dangerous to say. I don't mean that we should return to the old bighouse philosophy. On the other hand, I think we must begin to be selective in the use of our resources, particularly personnel and funds. When we try to give the same kind of education, treatment, and therapy to the old lugs that we give to the youthful and young adult offenders, we usually wind up with the youth and young offenders getting a pretty skimpy program. Realistic administration must concentrate the resources on those offenders and in those areas which are most promising. This, coupled with research and development, would suggest that we can become much more realistic than we have up to now.

I told you of my recent visit to North Carolina. I asked Mr. George Randal, commissioner of corrections, how he was able to accomplish all these interesting new developments in his State. He leaned back in his chair. "Well, I am tired of hearing correctional administrators declare 'I have nothing to do with politics in my system.'" Says Randal, "That's not at all realistic. I have to look to the legislature and to State officials for support, for understanding, for funds, for personnel, and for the means to accomplish about everything I want to. I'm one of the most active politicians in my State."

"I know everybody in the legislature. I see them frequently. I don't go through a State senator's county without stopping to say hello. I argue the hard facts of corrections with them. I do everything in my power to influence them to support corrections and they are supporting it. And it does pay off."

I suggest that Commissioner Randal has a convincing approach to the relationship between corrections and political realities.

Another fact I have seen demonstrated in a number of places around the country, not only in North Carolina, is that correctional administrators all too often underestimate

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favorable ones, and communism can still take the underdeveloped world.

This states the problem very plainly. Strategic computations indicate that we can hold on militarily in southeast Asia. But a military holding action is only temporary. Real victory will be achieved by one side or the other through superior application of techniques of nonmilitary warfare—persuasion, popular conviction that either one governing system or the other "offers them the best system for meeting their own needs."

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the editorial entitled "United States Must Not Quit Too Easily on Basic Problem in Vietnam," from the Atlanta Constitution of March 6, 1965, be printed in the Record at this point in my remarks.

The Atlanta Constitution, incidentally, has editorially endorsed the Freedom Academy bill.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Atlanta (Ga.) Constitution of Mar. 6, 1965]

**UNITED STATES MUSTN'T QUIT TOO EASILY ON BASIC PROBLEM IN VIETNAM**

Our American tendency to leap to wholehog conclusions may yet dissipate and destroy the hard lessons we have learned in Vietnam.

The current bombing of North Vietnam has reconstituted the U.S. position in South Vietnam. It has probably made negotiations for a cease-fire possible.

If luck runs well, the United States may soon be able to sit down across the table from the Communists and settle the war as we have known it.

If this had been tried a month ago, the Communists would have been able to derogue U.S. demands and ask, "If we don't agree, what are you going to do about it?" Under the old rules the United States could only have said, "We will fight you in the paddies for 10 more years," and might have had to.

Now, if negotiations come to pass, and the Communists ask, "What are you going to do about it if we don't agree?" the United States can reply, "We are going to remove a dozen more of your North Vietnamese towns from the map of Asia." Thus the bombing has presented to the Communists a wholly new encouragement to talk seriously about peace.

This is altogether to be desired. And if negotiations now come to pass, and end to the guerrilla war may be in sight.

But we Americans will be throwing away everything we have learned in Vietnam if we jump to either of two assumptions: First, that this means South Vietnam will stay non-Communist, and second, that this means U.S. military counterinsurgency in the paddies is a failure and that bombing alone is decisive.

The fact is that while bombing in conjunction with the years of counterinsurgency may bring the war to a decision point, the decision may be delusive. For if we assume that a mere guaranteed cease-fire and a graceful U.S. withdrawal can settle the Communist issue for the South Vietnamese, we're probably wrong; they may promptly opt for communism themselves, under the various prevailing pressures.

We may win battles in the name of peoples, but unless we win the peoples themselves they will go their own way regardless of how the battles went. Most South Vietnamese care little about ideological terms like communism and democracy. They go with the government that offers them the best system for meeting their own needs.

Communism has long assumed it can meet southeast Asia's needs better than free systems can, and even if the Vietcong is forced by our bombing to make a surface peace now, their long-range assumption will persist. The only real answer to the Communist assumption is to prove our own assumption—that free systems can excel communism in meeting the needs of people. This has been a major part of our 10-year ground effort in South Vietnam, with the military spearheading it. It has been inconclusive. Otherwise the bombing of North Vietnam wouldn't have been needed. While it has failed in many areas of the country, however, it has succeeded in many areas. It also is the really meaningful combat out there. It has been a start along the right track.

Yet if bombing of North Vietnam proves superficially effective in bringing a surface end to the short-range shooting in the south, Americans may be tempted to write off the counterinsurgency, civic action, and special forces techniques on the ground, and assume bombing is all we need. There are indications within the U.S. Army itself that this mistake is about to be made. It would be a dangerous mistake. Bombing may end the shooting, but the Vietcong may win the war. If our counterinsurgency effort in South Vietnam was insufficient, then we must value the lessons learned and perfect the system, not overlook the lessons and abandon the system.

No matter what short-term papers the bombers may force the Communists to sign, the long-term dispositions in southeast Asia will be decided by the people who live there. And if communism offers them more effective political, economic, social, and military systems than we can muster, our failures on the ground will endure long after our heroics in the air have been forgotten. Our failure in Vietnam has been primarily political, not military, and superficial bombing cannot erase the need for some long-range learning on the part of the United States. The start we made over the past 10 years in Vietnam may have been one of the most valuable strides toward realistic competition with communism that this Nation has undertaken. Military power is required to force decisions, as we have learned. But political effectiveness must accompany it, or the decisions will be unfavorable ones, and communism can still take the underdeveloped world.

**Mr. MUNDT.** Mr. President, a recent New York Times article concurs in the contention of our inadequacy in psychological warfare. Written by Seth S. King, the article quotes an American adviser to the South Vietnamese:

They [the Vietcong] always take the initiative and we can only try to run around and put out the fires.

To be perfectly honest, the Army of South Vietnam just isn't interested in psychological warfare. They think it's a waste of time even if we are willing to make most of the effort for them.

I ask unanimous consent that this article, entitled "Vietcong Ahead in Propaganda War", from the New York Times of March 17, 1965, be printed in the Record at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Mar. 17, 1965.]

**VIETCONG AHEAD IN PROPAGANDA WAR**

(By Seth S. King)

BANMETHUOT, SOUTH VIETNAM, March 16.—Belonging to your loved ones who are longing to see you? You are only being used as human shields by the Communists. Your Government will help you return to your homes."

Leaflets bearing this message have been floating down on towns and villages in the sparsely populated but strategically vital Central Highlands of South Vietnam.

The leaflets have been aimed at persuading young Vietnamese who have joined the Vietcong guerrillas to desert and return to their families.

The effort is part of a new campaign of psychological warfare inspired and financed by the United States and pressed upon the South Vietnamese Army by young American military advisers.

The United States is planning to expand the large information force already in South Vietnam and to provide it with more money.

In the last 6 weeks as the struggle for control of the highlands has moved into a new phase as the Vietcong try to cut South Vietnam in two. The propaganda war that has accompanied this drive has also been stepped up, and once again the Vietcong appear to have sped past the Government.

Vietcong agents have been matching the Government at every turn, even in the distribution of expertly printed leaflets in two colors.

Where the Government must fly over the sector in American planes equipped with loudspeakers, the Vietcong go into the villages and spend several days employing the "three withs"—eating with, sleeping with, and working with the people.

Communist guerrillas have shown unexpected speed and dexterity in spreading their propaganda in the highlands.

**REGIME EFFORT ASSAILED**

A Vietcong leaflet picked up at Quaiangduc, near the Cambodian border, contained on one side the following: "Struggle for better pay and guarantee of long life. Do not support the Government in its fighting. If you do you will die and your life will be wasted."

On the other side of the leaflet was a brief newsletter telling of Vietcong successes in the attack on the American billet at Quinhon and in closing Route 1 along the coast. It ended by saying that members of the Government "are fighting each other in Saigon even now."

The leaflet was dated February 19, the day of the most recent coup d'etat attempted in Saigon.

Other leaflets have been found all over the area promising "help and kind treatment" to regular soldiers who are "anti-American" and who "throw down their weapons."

The Vietcong have been equally quick to turn the Government's propaganda to their own advantages. Government troops recently found booklets in a number of villages. The cover was the same as that of a Government booklet explaining the protected-hamlet program; inside was a Vietcong propaganda tract.

Since the first week in February, when the Vietcong opened their drive in the Central Highlands, the guerrilla influence has trebled in Darlac Province an American adviser said.

"They always take the initiative and we can only try to run around and put out the fires," he said.

"To be perfectly honest," he went on, "the Army of South Vietnam just isn't interested in psychological warfare. They think it's a waste of time even if we are willing to make most of the effort for them."

**Mr. MUNDT.** Mr. President, if we had instituted something like the Freedom Academy when the concept was first approved by the Senate in 1960, we would have had a facility at which to familiarize Vietnamese officials with the art of psychological warfare. We can marvel at their hesitancy to utilize psychological techniques in their fight against Com-



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munist subversion, but one must also marvel at why our Government has been so hesitant to recognize that our failure to provide pertinent training in this field for foreign nationals who want it is opening a void in total defense against Communist and other totalitarian aggression.

Sponsors of the Freedom Academy bill in the Senate, Senators CASE, DOB, DOUGLAS, FONG, HICKENLOOPER, LAUSCHE, MILLER, PROUTY, PROXMIRE, SCOTT, SMATHERS, MURPHY, and myself, have, in introducing the bill, asked Congress to appraise U.S. global strategy in its entirety. We perceive critical fault in this country's appraisal of contesting world forces. As a Government, we refuse to accredit sincerity to the long-range challenge we face.

As I have discussed this matter in recent weeks — CONGRESSIONAL RECORD pages 4059, 4751-4753, 5276-5281—a whole new academic discipline concentrated around nonmilitary aggression has grown to maturity over the last generation, and is functioning under Communist direction; but the United States has not kept pace. By section 2(a)(2) of the Freedom Academy bill, Congress would recognize this inadequacy. We state:

The Communist bloc and the various Communist parties have systematically prepared themselves to wage a thousand-pronged aggression in the nonmilitary area. Drawing on their elaborate studies and extensive pragmatic tests, Communist leaders have developed their conspiratorial version of nonmilitary conflict into an advanced, operational art in which they employ and orchestrate an extraordinary variety of conflict instruments in the political, psychological, ideological, economic, technological, organizational and paramilitary areas enabling them to approach their immediate and long-range objectives along many paths. This creates unique and unprecedented problems for the United States in a conflict that is being waged in student organizations, peasant villages, labor unions, mass communication systems, in city and jungle, and institutions and organizations of every description, as well as in the world's chancelleries. Recognizing that nonmilitary conflict makes extraordinary demands upon its practitioners, the Communists for several decades have intensively trained their leadership groups and cadres in an extensive network of basic, intermediate, and advanced schools. The Sino-Soviet conflict capacity has been immeasurably increased by the mobilization of research, science, industry, technology, and education. . . .

Now one of the great American authorities on military affairs, Hanson W. Baldwin, military editor of the New York Times, has contributed his evaluation of total U.S. strategy; and his evaluation is consistent with these findings in the Freedom Academy bill. Writing in the November-December, 1964, issue of Ordinance, Mr. Baldwin says of our position:

... the threat [we face] is opportunistic, massive, and unrelenting, and it takes many forms—ideological, political, economic, psychological, and military. We must be prepared for a spectrum of conflict from such nuclear power confrontations as the Cuban missile crisis to a twilight war against Communist puppets.

But by far the greatest threat—one that has so far frustrated us—is the so-called "war of nations."

guerrilla, terrorist, and insurgency conflict now being waged in South Vietnam.

By establishing something like the Freedom Academy, Congress would move meaningfully toward squarely confronting this threat. We propose intensive research into a new spectrum of warfare about which we know so little. We propose to train our people and our allies' people in knowledge about the new spectrum, to improve their effectiveness in resisting nonmilitary aggression where it occurs. Our defense depends on these people. They should be fully knowledgeable about tactics used against us.

We do not propose to imitate Communist methods. We do propose to understand Communist methods, in order to be more effective against them.

Hanson Baldwin concisely assesses our strategic situation.

A great many of the new nations . . . [are] almost certainly destined to disappear from the map of history. Many . . . do not have the political, economic, or military power, or the population, skills, and resources to continue to exist . . . as independent countries.

There is underway a contest to determine where allegiances in these nations will be directed. Communist powers remain dedicated to world revolution.

Moscow's expansionist philosophy has not been abandoned, though the methods of achieving it have changed. And a new and far more aggressive Communist power—Red China—has complicated the global picture and worsened it.

Thus the political world we live in is still dominated by a major struggle between communism and anticommunism. But now there are several brands of communism, and many kinds of anticommunism and noncommunism.

Where is the contest waged?

... in Africa, Latin America, and, most threatened, the Middle East and southeast Asia. Hundreds of millions of uncommitted peoples—passive, ignorant, poverty-stricken, with no sense of identification with either side, no real sense of national loyalties—are the weather-vanes of tomorrow's history.

The stakes are huge. . . .

He identifies our antagonists:

Over and above all other considerations, we face a continuing struggle, with no end in sight—against an aggressive, expansionist Communist Russia and Communist China, and against plain "have-not" nations, intent on acquiring what we have.

Yet, among the millions of uncommitted whom Baldwin discusses are leadership groups friendly to us. They are friendly to us at least to the degree that they do not want their own governments undercut and taken over by Communists.

We have mutual interest with these people. To the degree that the Communist stance would be strengthened by converting these people and their resources to the Communist cause, so the Communist potential for strength is weakened as we help these leadership groups maintain their own national independence from Communist subversion.

They do not understand the method of aggression against them. We do not fully understand it. It is in our inter-

them as well as we can with the challenge they face, while at the same time acquiring full comprehension of the threat ourselves.

The problem calls for dual effort: Intensive research and extensive training. This is what we propose in S. 1232.

What works against enactment of this bill? Mr. Baldwin's discussion of domestic factors affecting our global strategy affords some insight:

The quality of idealism in the American people, which is reflected in our foreign policies . . . [is] an essential and desirable part of the American dream. But it has found expression in such unrealistic terms as "to make the world safe for democracy"; a "war to end war"; "the Four Freedoms"; "universal and complete disarmament." And it can and often does mean a trend toward "do-goodism," toward unrealistic, extreme aims or naive goals.

Perhaps this quality explains the State Department contention that Freedom Academy sponsors propose to imitate Communist methods. We emphatically do not.

We propose to understand Communist methods, in order to prepare our people to counteract those methods more effectively.

Mr. Baldwin poses, and then answers, several final questions:

Where does all this lead us? What should our national strategy be? What should be the principles that govern it . . . ?

The principles should be:

1. Collective security—not isolation. . . .
2. Flexibility—the avoidance of frozen thoughts and ideas and structures.
3. A national and Presidential will and determination to defend our vital interests. Power is of little value without the will to use it.

Establishment of the Freedom Academy would be consistent with, and responsive to Mr. Baldwin's understanding. It would lead to better comprehension of the struggle we are in and to far superior dissemination of this understanding among people who need it.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the Hanson W. Baldwin's article, entitled "U.S. Global Strategy," appearing in Ordinance for November-December 1964, be printed in the Record after my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From Ordinance, Nov. 12, 1964]

U.S. GLOBAL STRATEGY  
(Hanson W. Baldwin)

National strategy is the utilization of all elements of a nation's power to achieve its objectives. It must be couched in the active, not the passive, tense. It implies the implementation of a course of action—not merely the formulation of it.

The equations produced in the process of strategy formulation do not lend themselves to computer solutions, or to percentage calculations. For we are dealing, in the last analysis, with human beings. Whether human beings are rational or not is a matter of debate, but certainly it is true that the emotions which make human beings tick are intangibles. How, for instance, do you crank anger into a calculating machine?

This is simply to suggest that we must beware of too great a dependence upon the

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tools our rules. As aids to problem solving, computers, qualitative, quantitative and operational analyses, cost-effectiveness yardsticks, and the like are useful and proper. But do not confuse the means with the ends.

There should be one other cautionary caveat before we consider the factors that might go into the formulation and implementation of a national strategy. This is, of course, a statement of the obvious, but nevertheless a rule which history sometimes has disregarded. That is that no sound national strategy can spring fully armed from the brain of one man. It must, unless it is to be dangerously oversimplified or grossly distorted, represent the efforts of many, the input of scores of professional disciplines and thousands of facts distilled from a nation's treasure house of experts. It must be the product of many ideas and of the labor of many men—strategy, if you like, by committee or group action.

Such strategy may not appear to be as brilliant or as bold as the imaginative and ambitious unilateral plans of an Alexander, a Genghis Khan, a Napoleon, a Hitler. But where are those conquerors, and what were the bequests—save corpses unlimited—they left their nations?

Not even the President of the United States should have—nor is he likely to want—absolute power in the formulation of national strategy. This is too great a grant of power to entrust to the hands of any human, no matter how selfless and capable.

The formulation and the implementation of national strategy, then, must be a collective, a group effort, and human judgment, experience, knowledge, and emotion, as well as all the computers and technical tools and methods available to modern science, must be used in its formulation.

Strategy—like war—is an art and not a science. A long view of history is essential to sound strategy.

Consider some of the factors that influence or govern the formulation and implementation of an national strategy for the United States in the year 1964. First and most important of these is:

1. The global political situation: A situation of dangerous instability exists. World War II continued a process started in World War I—the destruction of the old order, the upset of the balance of power, the unleashing of revolutionary forces. Empires, dynasties, great states, and great princes fell from power; nations that were once great were all but destroyed; others were diminished in influence.

Vacuum of power resulted, and a bipolar world emerged from the ashes of conflict, with the United States and Soviet Russia so far superior to other powers that they could only be called superstates.

But this bipolar condition has changed. There have been splits and defections in the Western World, and cracks in the monolithic edifice of communism. Today we face a multipolar world—a world of infinite complexity.

The United States and the U.S.S.R. are still the major nations of the world in terms of power, but neither can count on complete support from its friends and allies. In the West, France, intent under De Gaulle in achieving once again the sense of "grandeur" and "greatness" which has always been an inseparable part of French achievements, is pursuing an individual—sometimes a solitary—course. The United States plays largely a lone hand in Asia.

But Russia's Eastern European satellites—notably, at the moment, Poland and Rumania, are restive. They are inspired to greater aspirations for national independence by the example of Tito's brand of national communism—as distinct from the international brand dominated by Moscow—and particularly by Mao Tse-tung's opposition to the Khrushchev policy.

The Sino-Soviet split is serious, and probably lasting. It started as a conflict of personalities and ideologies. It is possible that at some future time the split may be "papered over." But lasting causes of friction—in terms of real power rivalries—will continue to exist: border problems—Central Asia, Mongolia, Manchuria; pressures of tremendous Chinese population—700 million to a billion people close to the sparsely settled areas of Soviet Siberia; the obvious dangers to Russia of a China industrialized and equipped with atomic weapons.

In the last decade—particularly in the past 5 years—new political power centers have been created in our turbulent world—Peking, Tokyo, New Delhi, Cairo, Latin America, Africa.

A great many of the new nations—such as most of the African states—are nations in quotes, incapable of governing themselves—countries almost certainly destined to disappear from the map of history.

Many of them do not have the political, economic, or military power, or the population, skills, and resources to continue to exist as they are now constituted as independent countries.

Anticolonialism, one of the great political factors of the postwar period, has so far been a great unsettling and destabilizing influence.

The diplomat George Kennan, under the pseudonym of "Mr. X," was the original author—in a famous article in Foreign Affairs—of our "containment" policy. He wrote that the seeds of communism contain within themselves their own destruction, that if we could hold or "contain" Russian power within its frontiers, the forces of change would be bound to loosen Soviet society and reduce the aggressive expansionism of Moscow.

It didn't work. Communism expanded to Czechoslovakia, Red China, North Vietnam, and Cuba. And though Soviet communism has changed, Moscow's expansionist philosophy has not been abandoned, though the methods of achieving it have changed. And a new and far more aggressive Communist power—Red China—has complicated the global picture and worsened it.

Thus today the political world we live in is still dominated by a major struggle between communism and anticommunism. But now there are several brands of communism, and many kinds of anticommunism and noncommunism.

There are many kinds of neutralist, and there are all kinds of local and regional problems which complicate the main stream of conflict—the Kashmir problem for instance; the ambitions of the demagogic Sukarno; the machinations of Castro; Nasser's Pan-Arabism; the tribal warfare of Yemen; religious frictions and racial problems.

All these local problems are influenced and may be exploited by communism or anti-communism, with resultant back currents, eddies, whirlpools, rapids.

In today's complex world the frontiers of freedom are rather well defined in Europe. Except for divided Berlin and its access approaches there is little room for political ambiguity. Communist transgressions to the west of the Iron Curtain would mean war.

But there is no such clearly defined frontier in Africa, Latin America, and, most threatened, the Middle East and southeast Asia. Hundreds of millions of uncommitted peoples—passive, ignorant, poverty stricken, with no sense of identification with either side, no real sense of national loyalties—are the weather-vanes of tomorrow's history.

The stakes are huge—rubber, tin, oil, minerals, strategic position. More and more the tides of history have been sweeping to the full in Asia; we shall forget at our peril the lesson of 1905 when the Russian fleet was destroyed to Peking lies through Peking.

Over and above all other considerations, we face a continuing struggle, with no end in sight—against an aggressive, expansionist Communist Russia and Communist China, and against plain have-not nations, intent on acquiring what we have.

2. The nature of the threat: Put tersely, the threat is opportunistic, massive, and unrelenting, and it takes many forms—ideological, political, economic, psychological, and military. We must be prepared for a spectrum of conflict—from such nuclear power confrontations as the Cuban missile crisis to a twilight war against Communist puppets.

But by far the greatest threat—one that has so far frustrated us—is the so-called war of national liberation, the kind of guerrilla, terrorist, and insurgency conflict now being waged in South Vietnam.

3. Technological revolution: A third factor is the technological revolution, still unended: A-bombs, radar, nuclear power, etc.

The military meaning of the revolution is plain—for the first time since the days of the Indian wars we face the danger of devastating surprise attack—an attack which could eliminate us as a nation. The technological revolution has caused a shrinkage of maps; a major change in the time-space factor; foreshortened distances; rapid communications.

The technological revolution has obvious political, economic, and educational importance. The smaller world has political disadvantages as well as advantages. The crisis is on your doorstep every morning. It hasn't made all men brothers and is unlikely to do so. Economically, the technological revolution requires great sums to keep abreast in the technological race; a nation must have industrial power and superb skills.

The technological revolution means we must steer between the twin rocks of disaster—the garrison state—a state so militarized and guarded that liberties are sacrificed in the name of security—and the bankrupt state—a state bled white by expenditure for technological advance.

Yet we must steer the middle passage, since a major factor in the formulation of a strategy for our times is that the technological revolution is still unfinished.

4. A fourth factor which must be considered in the formulation of strategy is an economic one: It can be compressed into two phrases—"the revolution of rising expectations" and the "industrialization of hitherto undeveloped nations."

Many of the backward peoples of the world, lured by the promises of both communism and capitalism and vulnerable because of modern communications to new ideas, expect far more than their fathers had. They want what others have.

Some of them, to accomplish this, are attempting to industrialize hitherto agrarian, or undeveloped, economies, as in India, Egypt, and Cuba. The mixture is both politically and economically explosive.

5. A fifth factor is the population explosion: The world's population has increased from 1.2 billion in 1850 to 3.2 billion today, and there are no signs of any immediate leveling off. One may argue all one wants about the world's ability to feed and clothe and employ this vast and teeming mass; the plain fact of the matter is that the world isn't doing it, and the immense problems—religious taboos in India, for example—between the dream and the accomplishment make its realization unlikely. This, too, causes world instability, and the pressure of population increases the pent-up and revolutionary forces against every government.

6. The increasing dispersion of nuclear weapons: This factor is, of course, interrelated with all the others. It might be described as a "political" and a psychological factor, but its importance is such that it stands alone as a factor which can well increase international instability.

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France today has joined the "nuclear club" in a small way; in time, Paris will achieve a significant capability. Red China recently detonated her first atomic device. Now that she has, the political and psychological effects will reverberate through the Orient.

It will be a long time before Peiping achieves a really important or significant nuclear delivery capability, but when this occurs the world may be in real danger.

Other nations soon may join the atomic club. With each new membership the world's power balance, particularly in the regions affected, shifts slightly.

7. A seventh factor is the growing challenge of Soviet aerospace power and particularly of Soviet maritime power.

Soviet strategic thought has grown from the introverted "heartland" concept of warfare to the extroverted global and extraterrestrial "new look."

In the past, danger had always come to Russia by land. Hitler, and Napoleon before him, almost—but not quite—conquered Russia. The land marshals until relatively recently dominated Soviet strategic thinking; the buffer states of Eastern Europe attested to Moscow's fear of land invasion.

Today, Russia is looking upward to sky and space, and outward toward the seven seas. Her space achievements need no chronicling; they will continue, and if we have any doubts about Soviet determination to put a "comrade" on the moon, we may awake one morning to another disagreeable surprise. Russia already has become a major air and space power—ahead of us in the utilization of man in space.

Not so well known are her accomplishments at sea. She is second in total naval power, first in numbers of submarines, first in numbers of small craft, such as minesweepers, motor torpedo boats, and coastal defense vessels. (The United States has nothing like the missile-equipped Komar torpedo boats.)

Russia is first in deep-sea fishing fleets—both in numbers and quality. She already operates more ocean-going merchant ships than we do, and her total tonnage is expected to pass our declining merchant marine within the next two years.

Moscow plans a tremendous merchant fleet—which can only be used for global trade purposes and for the export of subversion as well as goods—which may approximate 20,000,000 to 25,000,000 gross tons by 1975-1980—the largest in the world.

The United States and all the maritime nations of the non-Communist world face major competition on the seas and in world trade.

So much for some—but by no means all—of the international factors that must be considered in the formulation of our objectives and our strategy.

What are some of the domestic factors?

First and perhaps of greatest long-term importance is the lack of national homogeneity in the American Nation. We are no longer "one people" in the old sense of 50 years ago. There are now major religious, ethnic, and racial—as well as political—differences which cannot be easily healed (e.g., civil rights and the school-prayer issue).

The growth of big government and the trend toward centralization of power, with all the difficulties and delays that also, redundancy, and bureaucracy imply, make the formulation of policy—and sometimes its implementation—exceedingly slow.

Command and control systems of uncanny global capabilities can soon a destroyer off Cuba or direct a battalion in Vietnam, but it has yet to be proved that this centralized Washington command post can win wars.

Never in the history of human conflict have so many been able to say "No"—so few to say "Yes."

The tremendous approval of the President and the decline in the power

of Congress is another factor to be considered. Congress is supposed to have the constitutional power to declare war and to raise and maintain armies and navies. But in the age of the technological revolution and of \$50 billion defense budgets, the effective power has passed from the hands of Congress to the hands of the Executive. The President can put us into war overnight by action, or inaction; Congress can only counter-signal.

The power of the Presidency—partly because of modern communications—transcends today by an immense margin what our Founding Fathers intended it to be. And, correspondingly, the personality, and the character of the President, his strength of will, his purpose and judgment, are major—perhaps decisive—factors in strategy formulation and particularly in implementation. Leadership and personality are the x factor in history.

The quality of idealism in the American people, which is reflected in our foreign policies. Make no mistake, this is an essential and desirable part of the American dream. But it has found expression in such unrealistic terms as "to make the world safe for democracy"; a "war to end war"; "the Four Freedoms"; "universal and complete disarmament." And it can and often does mean a trend toward "do-goodism," toward unrealistic, extreme aims or naive goals.

The need for explanation. The American public's "right to know" is not only a constitutional safeguard to our system of government and a monitor of government, but public information about and explanation of national objectives is essential to the attainment of these objectives.

This is particularly true in the kind of war we are most likely to have to fight—the type of counterinsurgency conflict we are now waging in Vietnam.

Public support for any long-drawn-out war of attrition is essential to success. A frank, comprehensive, and reasoned public-information policy on the part of all branches of government is essential to enlistment of that support for the duration. Otherwise public frustration or apathy or even opposition is bound to develop.

Washington, which so successfully enlisted Madison Avenue in the domestic political hustings, has made a botch of retaining public support for some of its national policies.

The quality of our peoples is another factor of importance to our consideration of strategy. What has been called the "crisis of values" has influenced contemporary history—and particularly Western civilization.

The loss of old values, the lack of faith in ancient symbols and old loyalties, are reflected in our rising crime rate, juvenile delinquency, inflated divorce statistics. And the draft rejection rate of 40 to 50 percent reflects the physical as well as the mental softness of too many American youths.

Slums, the problems of automation, unemployment, our decaying cities, our obsolescent railroads, depressed areas, inadequate education—all of these factors will influence the capability of the peoples of the United States for democratic self-government and for the projection of national power.

There are, of course, other domestic factors, which need not even the briefest elucidation. For instance: the capabilities of our economy and our industrial base; its strengths and limitations; the capabilities of our Armed Forces; their strengths and limitations, including the effects of current trends upon their morale and leadership and the downgrading of professional experience and judgment; the "civilianization" of the military profession; and, most important, our interpretation of foreign and potential enemy strengths and capabilities—our global intelligence system.

So much for some of the factors that go into the formulation of our objectives and our strategy.

Here are some of our national objectives which will, of course, influence the formulation of our strategy:

1. Economic prosperity and political freedom. This implies a vigorously expanding gross national product and some accommodation for the racial problem, for the problem of automation, and for depressed areas.

2. Maintain our global lead in industrial power, particularly in the capital-goods industries. Easier said than done; there are some serious lags now—machine tools, shipbuilding.

3. Stress educational quality, rather than quantity—particularly at collegiate levels; extend technical and trades training and physical fitness to lower age levels.

4. Foster educational, historical, religious, civic, and other appropriate programs for inculcation into the body and mind politics of the lasting values that have, in the past, made us great.

5. Extend the program of Peace Corps activities and civic action—including construction, training, and health programs by the Armed Forces.

6. Maintain—and if possible extend—the overall U.S. lead in the technological revolution, particularly in weapons applications.

7. Lead the world in the exploration and exploitation of space and the ocean depths.

8. Maintain and improve a global and space reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence system.

9. Maintain qualitative and quantitative naval and air superiority, and qualitative superiority on land.

10. Maintain U.S. entree to the Eurasian "rimlands"—the islands and coastal regions of Europe and Asia.

11. Delay, and if possible prevent, the industrialization and modernization of Communist China.

12. Exploit frictions and strains in the Communist world.

13. Weaken and ultimately eliminate Communist government in Cuba.

14. Revitalize and strengthen the Monroe Doctrine; i.e., prevent Communist coups and conquests in the Western Hemisphere.

15. Strengthen the Western and anti-Communist position in southeast Asia.

Fundamentally the Nation's objectives might be summed up as follows:

Globally—a more stable world (note I do not say a peaceful world).

Domestically—a nation where government and machine serve humanity.

It may be said that these objectives represent merely the old formula of being against sin and for God and country. This may be a fair criticism. But a nation's objectives must, "like a man's reach exceed his grasp, or what's a heaven for?"

Objectives, too, should be accorded priorities. What is clearly vital to the Nation's survival and welfare must be so identified; what is attainable in the short-term view must be so labeled; and more distant objectives must be so itemized. Too often we tend to label as "vital" interests which actually are remote.

Certainly what happens in many parts of Africa is not immediately vital to the United States and is not likely to become so unless there is a threat of Communist domination of the entire continent.

It may even be argued that we assumed too casually the obligations of power when we intervened in southeast Asia. Is Laos vital to the United States? Is South Vietnam? These are the \$64 million questions which policymakers must answer when they enunciate national objectives.

Where does all this lead us? What should our national strategy be? What should be the principles that govern it—the principles derived from the factors considered and the objectives set? These questions just summarized?

The principles should be:



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1. Collective security—not isolation. (The law of isolation is ended—the world needs us, we need the world.)

2. Flexibility—the avoidance of frozen thoughts and ideas and structures; no Maginot Line concept, no static defense.

3. A national and Presidential will and determination to defend our vital interests. Power is of little value without the will to use it.

#### RESOLUTIONS OF RICHARDSON, TEX., CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the Chamber of Commerce of Richardson, Tex., has recently adopted three resolutions with which I am pleased to find myself in complete agreement. In order that other Senators may be advised of the views of this active and dedicated chamber, I ask unanimous consent that the three resolutions be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolutions were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### RESOLUTION OF THE RICHARDSON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RE COMMENDING POLICY DECLARATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT AND PROPOSING A JOHNSON COMMISSION FOR IMPLEMENTING THEM

The board of directors of the Richardson Chamber of Commerce commends President Johnson upon his strong policy declarations for strict economy and an all-out campaign against waste and inefficiency in the Federal Government; for his proposal to reshape and reorganize the executive branch to meet more effectively the tasks of the 20th century; for his resolve to keep our Nation prosperous, militarily strong, and a leader in seeking peaceful relation with the other nations of his world; for his plans to pursue relentlessly our advances toward the conquest of space; his proposed new efforts to control and prevent crime and delinquency; and for his translation of these policies and plans into recommendations submitted to Congress.

To implement the goal of strict economy in the Federal Government and thus to aid in the attainment of all its goals, the Board of Directors of the Richardson Chamber of Commerce suggests that the President and Congress consider jointly the creation of a strong nonpartisan commission to be organized in the spirit of the Hoover Commissions of the past; that it consist of citizens of experience in Federal, State, and local governments but without other offices in any of such governments; that this commission be given a modest staff and authority to consider the physical records of the office of the budget and all other Federal offices and be charged with a duty to recommend to the President any and all reductions of current expenses in any such office which, in the opinion of that commission, could be made without adversely affecting policies of the administration with reference to the functioning of that office and the services to be performed by it. We suggest that such a commission be organized with expected continuity of office assured by overlapping terms of the members of the commission. It is submitted that an expansion of services of the Federal Government now under consideration will substantially increase the need of such an independent study of the operations of each department and agency of the Federal Government to the end that the dollar value of each dollar spent may be assured; accordingly, it is

Resolved, (1) The Richardson Chamber of Commerce urges the establishment of such a nonpartisan Johnson commission to implement the policies of this administration

for strict economy; (2) the appropriate officers of the Richardson Chamber of Commerce shall transmit this resolution to appropriate Texas Members of the U.S. Congress. (Unanimously adopted in regular meeting, Mar. 15, 1965.)

#### RESOLUTION OF THE RICHARDSON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RE AMENDING TAFT-HARTLEY ACT

Whereas it has been and is an American precept that man is a being with a free will, so endowed by his Creator; and

Whereas the system of free enterprise is peculiarly and especially a cherished American tradition, applying alike to the business enterprise and to the individual, to the employee, and to the employer; and

Whereas expressions of these propositions are included in many acts of social legislation; they are particularly emphasized, for example, in the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964:

"Sec. 703(a). It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;"

Whereas these propositions are a fundamental part of the laws of Texas, as seen in sections 1 and 2 of article 5207a of Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes of Texas, which was enacted in 1947 by the Legislature of the State of Texas in reliance upon section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act (Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 164(b)).

Taft-Hartley Act, section 14(b): "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or territorial law."

Article 5207a, Vernon's Annotated Texas Civil Statutes:

"Section 1. The inherent right of a person to work and bargain freely with his employer, individually or collectively, for terms and conditions of his employment shall not be denied or infringed by law, or by any organization of whatever nature.

"Sec. 2. No person shall be denied employment on account of membership or non-membership in a labor union;" and

Whereas there now are before the Congress of the United States proposals aimed at repealing 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, quoted in part hereinabove, so that laws of this State of Texas guaranteeing to individuals the right of free determination whether to join or refrain from joining a labor union, would be preempted: Therefore be it

Resolved, (1) The Richardson Chamber of Commerce opposes the repeal of section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, quoted above; (2) the appropriate officers of the Richardson Chamber of Commerce shall transmit this resolution to appropriate Texas members of the U.S. Congress.

(Unanimously adopted in regular meeting Mar. 15, 1965.)

#### RESOLUTION OF THE RICHARDSON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RE ADEQUATE HEALTH CARE FOR ELDERLY CITIZENS

The provision and the utilization of adequate health services to citizens above 65 years of age is a matter of interest and concern to all public spirited citizens.

Studies, including the 1963 Report of the President's Council on Aging, indicate that elderly citizens as a group meet their costs of living, including health care, much better

than the younger ages and enjoy remarkably good health for the most part. Over sixty percent of the 18 million elderly in the United States carry some form of voluntary prepayment health insurance; 72 percent of Texas' elderly citizens are so covered.

Yet many citizens do need additional aid such as those on old age assistance, or others who become really burdened in meeting the costs of an unexpected or major illness. Those who need assistance and only those, can get it under the Kerr-Mills Law passed in 1960. We in Texas amended our constitution in November 1964, so as to increase the benefits obtainable under this 1960 law, by those needy and elderly in Texas. Governor Connally stated in his annual message to the Texas Legislature in January 1965, that he favors this solution of the problem. It gives aid only to those in need whereas the social security approach assures aid to all employed, when they become ill in elder years, regardless of need and at much greater cost to all.

On January 27, 1965, Congressman Hurlong and Congressman CURTIS introduced identical bill, H. R. 3727 and H.R. 3736 known as the Eldercare Act of 1965. Aid to those in need under the Hurlong-Curtis Eldercare Act of 1965, would consist of medical, surgical, dental, hospital, nursing home, and drug benefits rather than being limited to hospital and nursing home care. State and Federal funds would be provided on a sliding scale basis, to persons aged 65 or older who are in need, as defined by their incomes, the defining limits being set by the individual States. Recipients would obtain policies providing a wide spectrum of medical, surgical, and hospital benefits from health insurance companies or from Blue Cross-Blue Shield plans. Under the proposal an individual would pay all, part, or none of the cost of the policy, depending upon his total income. Individuals whose incomes are under specified minimums would have the entire cost of the policy paid by the State agency that would administer the program. Eligibility for benefits would be determined solely by use of a simple information return in which the applicant would list his income from all sources.

The Hurlong-Curtis Eldercare Act of 1965 would thus maintain the basic principles that persons 65 years or older who need help in paying for health care should receive help, but only they; that maximum responsibility and authority for providing such help should be retained by the States; and that funds from the Federal source should be from general tax revenues; and that voluntary health insurance and prepayment principles should be utilized whenever possible.

All this is in sharp contrast with the proposed King-Anderson principle of a compulsory health insurance plan whereby social security taxes or payroll taxes on all ages of working citizens would provide certain limited hospital and nursing home benefits to the elderly.

Meanwhile, the provisions of the Kerr-Mills law have been accepted to greater or lesser degree by approximately 45 States and territories. There have been inequities and difficulties, but such problems existing in some States can be rapidly overcome. In Texas, our legislature is expected to provide quickly for those elderly citizens in need of further assistance by legislation under the Kerr-Mills Act. Therefore, be it

Resolved, (1) The Richardson Chamber of Commerce favors the enactment by Congress of the Hurlong-Curtis Eldercare Act of 1965 and by the legislature of Texas of legislation implementing assistance to the elderly in Texas in need, under the Kerr-Mills Act; and opposes the pending King-Anderson bill in Congress or other like measures; (2) the appropriate officers of the Richardson Cham-

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ber of Commerce shall transmit this resolution to appropriate Texas Members of the U.S. Congress.

(Adopted in regular meeting, March 18, 1963.)

#### SOVIET PERSECUTION OF THE JEWS

Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr. President, 20 years ago the most terrible war ever fought by mankind came to an end. With it there came the hope that religious persecution would forever be banished from the face of the earth. The shocking discovery of the scope of Jewish persecution under Hitler initiated vows by all men never to allow such events to happen again.

These vows were founded on something more than naive idealism, for while such action is against every conceivable code of moral order and decency, it is also a fact that such persecution will bring about the degeneration of a country by excluding from the national life a valuable portion of the intellectual and manpower resources of the country. It has become increasingly evident, however, that the Soviet Union is in the process of throwing these beliefs and hopes against the rocks with all the force its totalitarian strength can bring to bear.

The Soviet Union has extreme methods to hide events in its country that it feels might not be considered in good taste by those outside the Iron Curtain. Yet all of its suppression has not been sufficient to hide its dastardly acts toward its Jewish population. For the past 20 years, free people everywhere have hoped that persecution of religious peoples had ended for all time; yet, at this very instant, the persecution in Russia is looking distressingly similar to the persecution that took place during the Third Reich.

We see the singling out of the Russian Jews for allegations that have no basis whatsoever. As under the tyrannical regime of Hitler, the Jews in the Soviet Union have been singled out as the cause of the country's economic failures.

The propaganda that has been aimed at the Jewish population of the Soviet Union has been of the most vulgar nature, depicting the Jews in the same stereotype that was used by Goebbels, under Hitler, for the vilification of religion and all those who practice it.

There has also been widespread exclusion of the Jews from the same educational, cultural, and employment opportunities that the other Soviet citizens have been offered.

Mr. President, in view of these facts, I think the time has come for all good people to unite and, in a voice that will shatter the stone walls of the Kremlin, demand that these practices of persecution, bigotry, and hate be put to an end.

We have before us a concurrent resolution, submitted by the able Senator from Connecticut, that will inform the dictators of the Soviet people of our determination to put a stop to religious persecution in all its forms, wherever it occurs on earth. I have cosponsored Senate Concurrent Resolution 17 in the belief that the United States has an obligation, as the leader of free peoples, to step forward and condemn such malicious practices.

The resolution is clear in its intent. It states, in brief, that because we steadfastly believe in the freedom of all peoples to practice their religion, without interference of any sort; because the evidence overwhelmingly points to purposely vicious persecution of its Jewish population; and because the Soviet Constitution clearly defends religious freedom; we, therefore, condemn the Soviet Union for its betrayal of the principles of human rights and decency, in the hope that the Soviet Union will restore the rights of the Jews to practice their religion, free from harassment, and to maintain their culture as they have done throughout their history.

At this time, I urge every Senator to support this resolution reaffirming our belief in human rights; I urge all Members of the House of Representatives to join their Senate colleagues in the support of this resolution; and I urge all freedom-loving people the world over to join hands with the American people in asking freedom and dignity for the Jewish citizens of the Soviet Union.

#### LOW UNEMPLOYMENT GOOD NEWS

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, we are now entering the fifth year of continued improvement in our economy. This is the longest sustained economic expansion in the postwar period. As the employment statistics announced by the Labor Department today show, this fifth year promises to be one of the brightest.

The unemployment figures for the breadwinners of the country have been cut almost in half since the first quarter of 1961. At that point married men had an unemployment rate of 4.8 percent and today it has dropped to 2.6. This is equal to the low level recorded during the 1955-57 expansion period.

The economic growth since March a year ago—1,650,000—has meant jobs for 800,000 more adult men, 706,000 more adult women, and 200,000 more teenagers.

This is truly good news. It demonstrates that bold leadership given the tools to work with can keep the Nation on a prosperity-bound course.

We are indeed "continuing" toward the Great Society President Johnson seeks.

#### RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING: STAR-SPANGLED ARCHITECTURAL BLUNDER

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, Members of the Congress apparently are so well aware of the barbarian architectural qualities—if one can use the word "qualities" in this regard—of the third House office building that it is hardly necessary to bring to their attention additional informed judgments. Nevertheless, I think the Record should include a recent appraisal of the Rayburn Building by Miss Ada Louise Huxtable, as published in the New York Times of March 20, 1964.

Miss Huxtable concludes her lament about this artless and unbelievably expensive structure with a reference to a "point in time when the marble was over spilled marble." But if we should

not cry, we must at least be severely embarrassed, and should resolve to halt these economic and architectural atrocities on Capitol Hill.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Mar. 30, 1965]

THE RAYBURN BUILDING: HOUSE OFFICE STRUCTURE IS DESCRIBED AS A DULL, VULGAR, CORRUPT BLUNDER

(By Ada Louise Huxtable)

It is moving time on Capitol Hill for 189 Congressmen eligible for space in the new Rayburn House Office Building. The structure's three-room suites complete with refrigerators and safes are being raffled off to applicants who may have a view of the Capitol dome or an interior court, depending on seniority. Even seniority, however, does not give any legislator a door leading from his office, or his aid's office, to his working staff without passage through a waiting room full of constituents and special pleaders. To correct this small planning error would add \$200,000 to costs already estimated at anywhere from \$36 million to \$122 million for the expensive and controversial building.

Some Congressmen are moving in reluctantly. Representative THOMAS L. ASHLEY, Democrat of Ohio, for one rejected his office on sight. But he is making the move anyway this week because his present quarters are too small.

"This layout could paralyze us," he said during his inspection tour. "It's an ugly building."

Mr. ASHLEY is not alone. The professional architectural press has been bitterly critical as construction progressed. (The building has taken 7 years and \$23 million more to complete than originally estimated largely as the result of expensive miscalculations; change orders have reached 300 per cent over Government average; bid estimates on contracts have been as much as \$45 million off.)

There have been accusations of secret planning, pork barrel commissions and possible misuse of public funds. The fact that the general contractor was Matthew J. McCloskie, Democratic Party stalwart of Philadelphia has not escaped notice. But the storm swirls steadily around a behemoth that is obviously here to stay.

#### DEFECTS ARE NUMEROUS

Architecturally, the Rayburn Building is a national disaster. Its defects range from prodigal mishandling of 50 acres of space to elephantine esthetic banality at record costs. The costs are now being investigated by the General Accounting Office.

Equal to the question of costs, however, is the question of what Congress and the capital have received for the investment. It is quite possible that this is the worst building for the most money in the history of the construction art. It stuns by sheer mass and boring bulk. Only 15 percent of its space is devoted to the offices and hearing rooms for which it was erected.

Forty-two percent of the floor area is used for parking. Endless corridors have been likened to "Last Year at Marienbad." Stylistically, it is the apotheosis of humdrum.

It is hard to label the building, but it might be called Corrupt Classic. Its empty aridity and degraded classical details are vulgarization without drama, and to be both dull and vulgar may be an achievement of sorts.

The structure's chief design features are hollow exercises in sham grandeur. A super-colossal exterior expanse of stolid, Mussolini-style columns is embellished with sculpture that would be the apogee of art in the Soviet Union, where overcaressed muscles and ex-

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from the standpoint of human values and their protection.

Let no one tell me that this Government is going to be so coldblooded, even if the figures are granted to show some dollar savings, as to justify this act of inhumanity. Of course it will not. We cannot put the dollar sign ahead of the veterans. That is granting the figures of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs Mr. Driver, as being correct. And I do not grant it. I shall show, when I appear before the committee once again that his statements are erroneous. That was the reason I voted against him. I knew he was given to making erroneous statements.

When we think of the happy environment in which the veterans are living, when we think of the shock to them psychologically if they are moved, I am amazed that an Administrator of Veterans' Affairs would propose to distribute those veterans to other facilities, almost as though they were livestock, without consideration of the human values involved.

I put a value on this facility from the standpoint of the economy of our country. I am satisfied, on the basis of the evidence submitted, that it is in the economic interest of the United States, as well as in the interest of carrying out our moral obligations to the veterans.

But, says the Veterans' Administration, there is no hospital facility connected with the domiciliary home; therefore, if they become seriously ill they have to be transported to Portland. Whose fault is that? That is the fault of the Veterans' Administration. We tried for many years to have it use a hospital facility that was right there. This facility is a part of Camp White, a military camp with all the facilities of a wartime camp.

We tried to get the Veterans' Administration to use these facilities, without moving the veterans 200 or 250 miles. The alibi then was that they did not have enough doctors and medical personnel to send them to. We stopped that alibi because we offered them an agreement or arrangement with the Jackson County Medical Association of Medford, Oreg., under which the doctors agreed to supply them with what medical services they needed, in order to treat the veterans in Medford, if they would implement and equip the hospital facilities, most of the equipment having been moved out when Camp White was closed.

We called their bluff. I am satisfied they had plans for a long time to close this facility.

So we not only have the Montana hospital case; we not only have the Massachusetts case, on which the Senator from Massachusetts spoke earlier this afternoon; we not only have the problem in New York, but we have need for a thorough congressional investigation of the entire program of the Veterans' Administration. If there is an investigation that deals with the facts, the Administrator will be reversed, on the merits of the case, in my judgment, not only in connection with the Montana case, but also in connection with the domiciliary facility at Camp White, the Massachusetts case, the New York case, and the

others brought forth by Senators, which show that this is an example on the part of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs of unjustifiable and arbitrary discretion.

## INCOME TAX BENEFITS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, a recent article by Jim Lucas in the Washington Daily News for March 16 titled, "Army Hero Battles for Tax Break," describes the plight of our men in Vietnam, who know all too well that we are engaged in combat there, being told by the Internal Revenue Service that tax exclusion for combat pay is not available to them.

This situation arises because section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides for exclusion of certain pay received in a combat zone, requires that for the provision to become operative, the President must designate an area as a combat zone. This has not been done in the case of Vietnam.

The men who served in Korea were accorded this tax relief, and I find it difficult to distinguish that situation from the action in Vietnam. Combat is combat and no matter what we may call it, the action is no less hazardous and the bullets no less deadly.

I have today addressed a letter to the President asking that Vietnam be declared a combat zone so as to make section 112 applicable to that area, in order that we may treat the men serving there with as much approbation and fairness as that extended to the men who served this country in Korea.

I was particularly interested in the fact that the Army flier referred to in the article was Capt. Floyd R. Kendrick of El Dorado, Ark. Captain Kendrick could become the most decorated man in Vietnam, having received three decorations from the Vietnamese and one from the United States. I salute Captain Kendrick for his brave deeds and the service he is rendering his country.

I ask unanimous consent that a copy of my letter to the President, along with a copy of the article referred to above, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter and article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MARCH 29, 1965.

The Honorable LYNDON B. JOHNSON,  
The President,  
The White House, Washington, D.C.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: You will recall that Congress provided in the Internal Revenue Act of 1954 for excluding from gross income certain pay received by members of our military forces while serving in a combat zone (26 U.S.C. 112). Congress further provided that this section would become operative only upon designation of an area as a combat zone by the President of the United States.

As you know, such treatment was accorded our men who served in Korea, and it would seem equally appropriate to have similar benefits extended to those serving in Vietnam. The situation in Vietnam appears to come well within the precedent established in Korea, and most certainly the hardships endured by our men are indistinguishable.

I am aware that sensitive foreign policy questions are raised when an area is designated as a combat zone. It would seem to me, however, that we have a fundamental

obligation to treat our servicemen in Vietnam with as much fairness as that extended to the men who served this country in Korea.

My attention was drawn to this matter by an article by Jim Lucas in the March 16 Washington Daily News about Capt. F. R. Kendrick of Arkansas, who is seeking to have this tax relief made available to our men in Vietnam. The article notes that Captain Kendrick, a helicopter pilot, has been decorated three times by the Vietnamese and once by the United States.

With highest personal regards, I am,  
Respectfully yours,

JOHN L. McCLELLAN.

## WAR? WHAT WAR? IRS ASKS—ARMY HERO BATTLES FOR TAX BREAK

(By Jim G. Lucas)

VINH LONG, SOUTH VIETNAM, March 16.—A much-decorated Army flier in the Vietnam war is asking Uncle Sam to give him the same tax break given to the men in Korea a dozen years ago.

Capt. Floyd R. (Pete) Kendrick, of El Dorado, Ark., and Killeen, Tex., is invoking a section of the Internal Revenue Code which permits officers to deduct \$200 a month from their taxable income for time served in a combat or hostile-fire zone. This would mean \$500 to \$600 for most officers.

The section also provides that warrant officers and enlisted men pay no taxes on income earned in a hostile-fire or combat zone. Officers and enlisted men who served in Korea got those tax privileges. Men serving in Vietnam so far have been denied them, presumably because the United States does not admit it is actively involved in the war.

Captain Kendrick will send the Internal Revenue Service 10 pay vouchers from March to December 1964. Each voucher lists \$55 a month for "hostile-fire pay."

Captain Kendrick's attorney will argue that as a helicopter pilot decorated three times by the Vietnamese and once by the United States, Captain Kendrick is in no sense an adviser but an active participant in the war against the Communists. Also, that with escalation of the war against North Vietnam, the fiction that Americans are here merely as "advisers" no longer is valid.

The chances Captain Kendrick will get the tax relief he seeks are slim. Says an IRS spokesman:

"In order for this section to apply, an area must be designated a combat zone by the President by Executive order. As of now, Vietnam has not been so designated, therefore the exclusion is not available."

A bill was introduced in the Senate (S. Res. 459) on last January 12 by Senator JOHN TOWER, Republican, of Texas, which would designate Vietnam a combat zone for Federal tax purposes.

## NOTHING

However, the Tower bill would do nothing for the likes of Captain Kendrick and his young sidekick, Lt. Jerry Thiels of Alexandria, La., who also plans to claim the exemption. Lieutenant Thiels piloted one of the helicopters which was sent in at Da Ngai on December 27 to pick up the crew of a downed chopper, a rescue operation in which I took part.

If all of the decorations for which he has been recommended are approved, Lieutenant Thiels could become the most decorated man in Vietnam. The Tower bill, however, is not retroactive and would favor men serving after its enactment over those who already have served, been wounded, or have died in Vietnam.

## POSITIVE PROGRAMS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr. President, some 2 months ago, on the Senate floor, I called for legislation which

would give New England, and other regions of the country, the opportunity to develop positive programs of economic growth. It was my feeling, and that of many of my colleagues, that where Appalachia may have required a legislative priority in obtaining special Federal assistance, other areas of our Nation should be similarly benefited by Federal economic planning and development funds.

For New England, I recommended that a regional development commission be established to make a broad economic study of the region's needs. This study would concern unemployment, poverty, education, health, housing, transportation, and the development of our industrial and material resources. From it, we could fashion a long-range, multistate development program on the one hand, and special multicounty, subregional programs on the other.

This suggestion was reaffirmed in my recent address to the Massachusetts Legislature, and in many discussions which I have had with representatives from government, industry, labor, and the academic world. The response to this concept of regional and subregional planning and special funding was tremendous.

I am therefore delighted that the administration's economic development bill introduced in the Senate today, goes as far as it does, in meeting these needs for regional planning and economic improvement.

First. It recognizes the need for regional and subregional planning. It provides for the establishment of regional action planning commissions to prepare long-range development programs within the context of overall industrial, transportation, recreation, and other natural resources planning, on a multistate basis. It also provides planning funds for multicounty development districts to foster economic growth programs over large areas of redevelopment.

This will give the New England States an excellent opportunity to study their needs and come up with viable economic improvement programs.

Second. It provides for an expanded and more flexible grant and loan program for public improvements and industrial development, including supplementary grants to help the most needy communities. Of particular interest to New England is the provision for grants and loans to areas where there is a sudden plant shutdown or closing of a military installation.

Third. It emphasizes the importance of concentrating funds on projects which will do the most good for an overall growth plan for groups of areas. In my speech in the Senate on regional development, I suggested:

Our main concern is to concentrate Federal and State funds in a manner which will do the most good on a long-range basis. This can only mean that we cannot stop at borders of our communities, or of our counties, or even our States, to bolster areas of lagging economy. We must coordinate the potential of regions and subregions to lift up and stimulate the distressed and underdeveloped centers that are the logical ones for future growth.

I am very pleased that this regional approach to improving our distressed and underdeveloped areas has been incorporated in the legislation.

My particular concern with the bill lies in the moderate amount of money authorized. I believe an effective growth program of the dimension contemplated in this bill must have substantial funds. One of the major problems with Area Redevelopment Act and accelerated public works programs in the past was too little funds spread over too large an area. I would support efforts by Congress to increase the authorizations here.

There are sections of the bill which will need to be strengthened and clarified, but, by and large, the approach of the legislation is a good one, and it will receive my support. I am hopeful that New England and other regions of our country will lend their support to this bill, so that we can get on with the job of preparing a good regional economic program.

#### TAXPAYERS SURPRISED TO FIND THAT 1964 TAX REDUCTION WAS NOT AS GREAT AS THEY HAD BELIEVED

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, there appeared an article in yesterday's issue of the Washington Star entitled "Nineteen Hundred and Sixty-four Trap Closes—Loans Boom in Tax Lament."

I shall read the first paragraph of that article:

Loan companies and banks are enjoying an unprecedented bonanza from cash-short taxpayers who failed to heed the warning that last year's tax cut had a built-in pitfall.

The fact is that the taxpayers never had a chance. That pitfall was built in by an administration which wanted to give the American taxpayers the impression that they were getting a greater tax cut than that which they were actually getting. As a result, the withholding rate was reduced to 14 percent although the administration knew at the time it was inadequate. The administration even insisted that it be reduced to 14 percent, effective on all payrolls following the date of the enactment of the bill. The administration insisted that the employers withhold only the 14 percent. Taxpayers were encouraged by the administration to spend the difference in order to stimulate the economy on the eve of the election. They wanted everything booming at the time of the election and expressed no concern as to the ultimate consequences.

While it is true that the Internal Revenue Service warned the taxpayers, at the same time it is also true that the leaders of the administration were countermanning that warning and were telling the people, "Spend your money. Put it out into circulation. This is a bona fide tax cut the Great Society has given."

President Kennedy had originally recommended a withholding rate of 15 or 16 percent. The House approved the bill with the withholding rate fixed at 15 percent. Upon direct orders from the

White House the majority of the Finance Committee reduced the rate to 14 percent. Then the Treasury Department even rushed out instructions to employers to use this lower rate on all payrolls even though they represented payment of wages in earlier weeks.

Now the taxpayers are finding that the tax cut was not as much of a reduction as they were told it was, and many people are having to go to finance companies to borrow. They are being required to pay exorbitant rates of interest in order to finance this unexpected obligation with which they have been confronted. This is not the fault of those people. They were misled by the administration for what was obviously a political motive. Therefore, I believe the administration has a responsibility to recognize that fact and to provide a more convenient repayment formula on the part of those who were caught in this box through no fault of their own.

During the last few days I have had several meetings with representatives of the Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department. They recognize that this is a serious problem and is one which will get worse as April 15 approaches. Around \$500 million is involved in this underwithholding.

We are hopeful that through administrative procedures some correction will be made. I recognize that the Department is trying to devise a plan, so I shall wait until next week to see if the problem cannot be solved administratively. I join in the hope that some relief can be granted, because large numbers of taxpayers are affected. The individual amount involved may be only \$50, \$60 or a couple hundred dollars, but if they do not have it available it represents a large sum.

Furthermore, if the \$400 or \$500 million that is involved is taken out of the economy in one 30-day period, just as that amount may have stimulated business as it entered the economy last year, it certainly could cause a jolt to the economy right now.

Therefore, I think the administration would be well advised to correct the situation so far as it involves the taxpayers. The difficulty in which the taxpayers find themselves is not their fault; it is one which was created for them by the administration.

However, if a satisfactory plan is not announced by next week I shall offer a resolution which I think will remedy the condition.

I ask unanimous consent that the article to which I have referred, written by Philip Shandler and published in the Washington Star on March 31, 1965, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NINETEEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FOUR TRAP CLOSING—LOANS BOOM IN TAX LAMENT  
(By Philip Shandler)

Loan companies and banks are enjoying an unprecedented bonanza from cash-short taxpayers who failed to heed the warning that last year's tax cut had a built-in pitfall.

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Association adopted a number of important resolutions at its 88th annual convention in El Paso.

The resolutions deal with such pressing matters as cattle prices, reapportionment, screwworm eradication, farm wages, bracero workers, and hoof-and-mouth disease. In order that other Senators may share the views of this well-informed association, I ask that the resolutions be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolutions were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED AT THE 88TH TSCRA CONVENTION

Whereas monthly cattle on feed reports have been available for Texas since January 1964; and

Whereas these reports prepared by the Statistical Reporting Service of the United States Department of Agriculture are important to the Texas Cattle Feeding Industry: Therefore be it

*Resolved*, That the Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raisers Association reaffirms the desire of the cattle industry to have these reports continued and commends the Statistical Reporting Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture for the good job it is doing in compiling the monthly reports.

Whereas the selling of fed cattle on a carcass weight basis has become increasingly important in the marketing structure; and

Whereas it is extremely important that the weighing of the carcasses be conducted on accurate scales and by competent personnel: Therefore be it

*Resolved*, That the Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raisers Association express encouragement to the Packers and Stockyards Division of the U.S. Department of Agriculture that it intensify its effort to assure livestock producers that scales used in these transactions are accurate and that the individuals operating the scales are certified weighers: Be it further

*Resolved*, That the Packers and Stockyards Division of the U.S. Department of Agriculture be urged to require the packer purchasing cattle on a carcass basis to furnish the seller with an accurate and complete accounting of the transaction.

Whereas it anticipated that there will be introduced into this session of Congress proposed legislation that would transfer the cost of Federal meat inspection from the Federal Government to the meat processing industry; and

Whereas processors operating interstate are obliged by law to have Federal inspection performed; and

Whereas inspection of meat is done primarily in the interest of the public at large: Therefore be it

*Resolved*, That the Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raisers Association inform the members of Congress of its opposition to any such proposed legislation when introduced, and urge that meat inspection be continued at Government expense and not be charged to processors.

Whereas the Congress of the United States and most State legislatures were originally and deliberately apportioned one house by population and one house by area; and Whereas, this legislative structure has been the basis of the strength of our Republic and the hope of the free world; and

Whereas a recent Supreme Court decision, if permitted to stand, would destroy this American concept of fair representation; and

Whereas, the members of the Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raisers Association be-

lieve that this decision was based on considerations other than constitutional law: Therefore be it

*Resolved*, That Congress, State legislatures and the citizenry of the United States be alerted to the dangers inherent in this decision and be urgently petitioned to adopt a constitutional amendment that will preserve our present legislative structure.

Whereas the 88th annual convention of the Texas & Southwestern Cattle Raisers Association has been advised of the necessity for additional screw-worm eradication program funds: Therefore be it

*Resolved*, That the entire membership of the association be urged to give its wholehearted and aggressive support to the effort to provide sufficient funds which will insure the successful completion of private participation in this important program.

Whereas it is anticipated that certain bills will be introduced in the current session of Congress to extend the minimum wage and hour law to farm and ranch labor; and

Whereas, such legislation would create serious problems in the operation of farms and ranches: Therefore be it

*Resolved*, That the Texas & Southwestern Cattle Raisers Association notify the Members of Congress of its strong opposition to the extension of the wage and hour law to farm and ranch employees.

Whereas the farm and ranch labor situation has deteriorated rapidly; and

Whereas there is an ever increasing need on U.S. farms and ranches for supplemental foreign workers: Therefore be it

*Resolved*, That the Texas & Southwestern Cattle Raisers Association recommends that administrative procedures be adopted by the Federal Government to permit the admission of such workers into the United States under existing provisions of the immigration laws.

Whereas eradication of screwworms in the South and the five States of the Southwest has been accomplished and demonstrated for a period of 13 months; and

Whereas State and producer funds have supported 50 percent of the costs of a holding action and movement of the program into an international area; and

Whereas the screwworm program has become a Federal responsibility on the basis of dangers of reentry only: Therefore be it

*Resolved*, That the Congress of the United States be urged to make provision for the financing of a program to protect the livestock and wildlife of the United States for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1965.

Whereas the 89th Congress of the United States has before it a request for a supplemental appropriation for the continued operation of the screwworm eradication program in the Southern and Southwestern States and Mexico; and

Whereas the State of Texas and the livestock producers of the several States are contributing \$550,000 in matching, non-Federal funds; and

Whereas the continued success or failure of this important program depends upon the availability of these Federal funds requested: Therefore be it

*Resolved*, That the Members of Congress be urged to take prompt action in providing the necessary Federal funds at the earliest possible date and be informed that the Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raisers Association considers this matter to be of maximum importance.

Whereas we commend our regulatory officials for their excellent work in preventing entry of foot-and-mouth and other exotic

and highly contagious diseases into the United States, to the end that the health status of the cattle in the United States, is the envy of the world; and

Whereas the Canadian Department of Agriculture has announced it will allow direct importation of live cattle from countries known to be infected with foot-and-mouth and other highly contagious diseases: Therefore be it

*Resolved*, That we express grave concern over the Canadian action and urge our Federal officials to protest and request the Canadian Government to rescind its action; and be it further

*Resolved*, That we strongly urge the U.S. Department of Agriculture not to permit entry of cattle from countries which open their borders to cattle from countries known to be infected with foot-and-mouth or other highly contagious diseases.

Whereas the ranch and farm producer is suffering severely from an increasingly narrowing profit margin; and

Whereas this condition is due primarily on the one hand to a low sale price for his product and on the other hand to a high cost of production resulting from an increasing cost of labor, equipment, supplies, and increasing State and local taxes, particularly ad valorem taxes: Therefore be it

*Resolved*, That the Legislature of Texas be urged to adopt legislation which would provide that, as the urban population of the State expands into areas in which the land historically has been used for farming and ranching purposes, the tax assessing agencies be required to evaluate for tax purposes lands historically and currently used for agricultural and livestock purposes on the basis of the agricultural productive value of the land rather than on an inflated value related to the speculative growth of urban development onto the land at some future date.

VIETNAM—THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, last Thursday the senior Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] performed an important service to the country when he spoke on Vietnam. He pointed out that while we speak of our willingness to go to honorable negotiations, at the same time we prescribe "conditions as a prerequisite which will not be acceptable." We are demanding, in fact, something close to unconditional surrender.

Walter Lippmann, in his article published today, gives the Senator's speech the attention it deserves.

Consistently over the darkening months of the Vietnam crisis, Walter Lippmann has spoken in clear and reasoned tones. He has not simplified the complex, nor has he avoided the unpleasant. Our policymakers would not lightly dismiss what this wise man says. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that his article of today, April 1, be made a part of the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TODAY AND TOMORROW: THE BASIS OF NEGOTIATION

(By Walter Lippmann)

The cardinal defect of the administration's conduct of the war in Indochina has been pointed out by a Republican Senator, JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, of Kentucky. In a statement last week (March 25), Senator COOPER said that the U.S. Government, like its ad-



versaries in Pieping and Hanoi, is "prescribing conditions as a prerequisite to negotiations which will not be accepted." The Communists are making it a condition of a negotiation that the United States must withdraw from Vietnam; we are making it a condition of a negotiation that North Vietnam must withdraw from South Vietnam. "This is," said Senator COOPER, "a kind of demand from both sides for unconditional surrender."

It is, therefore, highly important that the administration put itself in a position where negotiation is possible, granting that even if it did so, Hanoi and Peiping may gamble on winning the war in order to overrun South Vietnam and inflict a smashing defeat on the United States. But, regardless of what they do, we must come into court with clean hands. The administration needs to clarify its own position—in order to set in motion a movement for negotiation and, failing that, to put the onus of prolonging and widening the war unmistakably on our adversaries.

There is a mistaken impression in this country that we are ready and willing to negotiate but that the other side is imposing intolerable conditions; namely, that we should withdraw our forces before the negotiation begins. Senator COOPER rejects the Communist condition, as do all of us who have been actively interested in this question. We cannot withdraw our forces until there has been a political settlement in Indochina, a settlement which promises to last because it serves the primary interests of all concerned.

But what, as a matter of fact, is our position? It is that before negotiations can take place, the north must demonstrate its readiness "to leave its neighbors alone." Secretary Rusk has avoided a precise definition of that phrase. We know that "illegal infiltration of military personnel and arms" is considered to violate that condition. That "leaving your neighbors alone" means also withdrawal of infiltrators who are already there has at times been suggested but never formally stated.

Senator COOPER says of this position: "I think it unlikely that the Communists will agree to this condition for negotiations, as we will not agree to their condition that the United States withdraw."

What Senator COOPER is asking the administration to do is what was done in the Korean war: "No such conditions were imposed by either side prior to negotiations, but a cease-fire was sought." Until the administration comes around to this position, its diplomacy will be confused.

Last week (March 25) the President issued a statement that "we have said many times—to all who are interested in our principles for honorable negotiation—that we seek no more than a return to the essentials of the agreements of 1954—a reliable arrangement to guarantee the independence and security of all in southeast Asia."

This is rather puzzling. The agreements of 1954 were reached at Geneva in a conference in which there participated not only the Indo-Chinese states but also Russia, Red China, Britain, France, and the United States. The agreements ended the fighting between the French Union forces and the Vietminh in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. These states were to become independent countries, with Vietnam partitioned at the 17th parallel into two zones pending general free elections to be held by January 20, 1956.

The cease-fire agreement was signed by the military commanders. But in addition, the Geneva Conference issued a final declaration, dated July 21. This declaration contained the following principles of settlement. One of the principles was that the cease-fire prohibited the "introduction into Vietnam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions." The

Geneva declaration went on to say that "the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary." Furthermore, the declaration said that "general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission."

The United States did not sign the final declaration. But the Under Secretary of State, Gen. Bevell Smith, made a "unilateral declaration" which said that the United States supported the agreements and that "in connection with the statement in the declaration concerning free elections in Vietnam, my Government wishes to make clear its position which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954, as follows: 'In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly.'"

The United States encouraged the Diem government in Saigon to refuse to hold the elections of 1956, almost certainly for the quite practical reason that they would have been won by the Communists.

Considering the essentials of the 1954 agreements, it is not easy to understand what it means to say now that "we seek no more than a return to the essentials of the agreements of 1954." I am afraid it means that in the diplomatic conduct of the war in Vietnam, the diplomats have not been doing their homework.

#### A FEDERAL FISCAL PROGRAM FOR SOUND ECONOMIC GROWTH

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, one of the most distinguished publications in my State, West Texas Today, a magazine of the West Texas Chamber of Commerce, printed in its March issue an article of major importance which I call to the attention of the Senate.

The article is entitled "A Federal Fiscal Program for Sound Economic Growth." It is a result of studies, by the Federal finance committee of the Council of State Chambers of Commerce, of Federal spending and tax policies during the postwar period.

The article makes this sage observation:

The Nation must choose between uncontrolled Federal spending, chronic budgetary deficits, excessive taxation, continuing price inflation, and the instability of an overheated economy, on the one hand; and rational spending policies, budgets ordinarily balanced, moderate taxation, a dollar with stable purchasing power, and a soundly based, healthy, growing economy on the other.

The article then makes some most worthwhile suggestions about how the second situation described above can be reached. I ask unanimous consent that the entire article be printed at this point in the RECORD, so that other Senators may be advised of these vital views.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A FEDERAL FISCAL PROGRAM FOR SOUND ECONOMIC GROWTH—FINANCIAL REFORMS NEEDED BADLY, COUNCIL OF STATE CHAMBERS SUGGESTS

#### INTRODUCTION

This Federal fiscal program for sound economic growth is the result of studies by the Federal finance committee of the Council of State Chambers of Commerce of Fed-

eral spending and tax policies during the post-World War II period. It is a revision of similar programs published in 1945, 1948, 1956, 1957, 1960, and 1961.

In the fiscal year 1948 Federal spending fell to \$33 billion—the lowest post-World War II level. The Korean war and the attendant rearmament program, together with increased nondefense spending, raised expenditures to \$74 billion in 1953. In order to finance this increased spending, Congress twice raised the tax rates on incomes of individuals and corporations, increased various excise tax rates, and imposed a further tax on corporate incomes in the guise of a so-called excess profits tax. After termination of the Korean war, Federal expenditures declined for 2 years to \$64 billion in 1955 and some tax relief was accorded individuals and businesses.

Since 1955 Federal spending has risen every year but one. During the 5 years through 1960 spending rose by \$12 billion to \$76 billion. Then in the next 4 years through 1964, expenditures rose by \$22 billion to \$98 billion for an average increase of \$5½ billion a year. With this spending rise apparently halted for 1965, Congress enacted an overall \$11½ billion tax reduction for individuals and corporations effective over 2 years, calendar 1964 and 1965.

The rise in total Federal cash payments, including the social security and other trust fund operations, is even more phenomenal than the growth of the administrative budget. Federal cash payments to the public soared from \$36 billion in 1948 to \$94 billion in 1960 and to \$122 billion in 1964. This latter amount is an increase of 239 percent over 1948 and 30 percent in just the last 4 years.

Also reflecting a tremendous growth during this period is the Nation's indebtedness. Public debt, including Federal, State, and local, rose from \$270 billion in 1948 to almost \$400 billion in 1963, and over the same period net private debt grew from \$201 billion to \$753 billion. Thus, the total national indebtedness had reached \$1,150 billion in 1963 and is even greater now.

Moreover, the Federal public debt of \$315 billion is only a minor fraction of the actual accrued obligations of the Federal Government based on existing legislation and past commitments. The unfunded accrued liabilities include \$30 billion for military retirement, another \$30 billion for civil service retirement, and the astronomical total of about \$400 billion for the social security program. Obligations for veterans' pensions, disability compensation, and other benefits come to about \$300 billion. These unfunded commitments together with the Federal public debt total 1 trillion, 75 billion dollars. This is the real magnitude of the Federal obligation for past services.

The national economy has, of course, grown considerably since 1948 but not in proportion to the growth in Federal spending. While administrative budget expenditures and total Federal cash payments had risen 197 percent and 239 percent, respectively, by 1964, the gross national product rose only 141 percent and national income only 130 percent.

#### FINANCIAL REFORMS ARE NEEDED

The Nation must choose between uncontrolled Federal spending, chronic budgetary deficits, excessive taxation, continuing price inflation, and the instability of an overheated economy, on the one hand, and rational spending policies, budgets ordinarily balanced, moderate taxation, a dollar with stable purchasing power, and a soundly based, healthy, growing economy, on the other.

Our economy seems always to be in a state of crisis. There is never enough employment, many families have inadequate incomes, living costs keep rising, and the un-

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It is my belief that the immorality of most contraceptive devices lies in the fact that they prevent the sex act from proceeding to its normal culmination. The end of a thing being its nature, in the Aristotelian sense, such an intervention is therefore against the nature of the act itself. In my opinion, the pill does not intervene in the sex act; it merely fosters certain conditions permitting the act to proceed to its normal end, although conception—because of the absence of ova—will not ensue.

I am not a professional moralist, and the professional moralist probably would tear me to tatters. I have hoped the professional moralist eventually would come around to my viewpoint, agree with me upon the validity of the distinction I make, and thus morally justify the use of the pill.

However, after listening to the papers presented at this conference, I am better educated and I now realize that the pill alone will not solve the problem. In answer to a question from the floor, Dr. Berelson conceded that oral contraceptives have not proved to be entirely acceptable in the pilot projects to which he referred in his paper, but he was most hopeful about future results.

I, for one, cannot see why we, as members of a pluralistic society, cannot support this policy.

According to Dean Moran:

"We have twice as many people as we had a little over 60 years ago on this globe, but we have them on a smaller, more interdependent globe, where they are more aware and where what they do may threaten our peace and security \* \* \* because we now have so many more people, we are going to have more—how many? No one can really tell but the base is bigger, and 2 times 4 is bigger than 2 times 2. Our capacity to control death has thus far been greater, cheaper, and easier than our capacity to increase the production of the wherewithal by which the people who did not die might live better."

Father Drinan summarized existing dilemmas in both U.S. domestic and U.S. foreign programs concerned with population control, as they relate to Catholics. In conclusion, he said:

"In thinking of the problems associated with an exploding world population it might be very helpful if Catholics would begin by considering both the principle that responsible parenthood is a moral imperative and the commitment which the church has made to respect and honor the religious liberty of all men. If Catholic thought on fertility control commenced with these two moral principles it might result in judgments substantially different than many of the conclusions enunciated by Catholics up to this point in the ongoing worldwide debate regarding what humanity should do to prevent its own suicide by overpopulation."

We convened to hear suggestions about avenues that should be explored in seeking solutions, and also to be forewarned about undesirable avenues which would lead only to moral, sociological, or psychological cul-de-sacs. I think we have achieved those objectives.

EXHIBIT 2

[From Commonweal, Jan. 22, 1965]

POPULATION PLANNING

In his state-of-the-Union message, President Johnson said that it would be the aim of his administration "to seek new ways to use our knowledge to help deal with the explosion in world population and the growing scarcity in world resources." This passage in the message was short, but its implications are wide-ranging. President Eisenhower, one recalls, specifically rejected the idea of Federal funds being used to aid foreign countries in coping with population

pressures. President Kennedy approached the matter somewhat less gingerly. In 1963, he lauded the fertility studies being conducted by the United Nations and the National Academy of Sciences, and, going one step further, approved a memorandum of Secretary of State Dean Rusk informing foreign aid missions that the United States would be receptive to requests for some forms of aid in population planning. Now it would appear that President Johnson is going to allow the Government to play an even more active role.

Why has the Government gradually shifted its position in the past few years and, specifically, why is President Johnson apparently confident that increased population planning aid will not set off a domestic political reaction? The most plausible answer is doubtless the great consensus throughout the world and in the United States that the economic and social well being of the underdeveloped nations will depend, in great part, on their ability to slow down the population growth rate. But of equal significance, from a political point of view, is the fact that most Catholics are now inclined to agree with this consensus; thus a major source of opposition has lessened. Two signs of a change in Catholic attitude are suggestive: In Latin America, reportedly, the Catholic hierarchy has cooperated in population study projects underwritten by American foreign aid funds; at home, in a related issue, the use of Federal funds to establish a few birth control clinics in cooperation with municipal governments has not elicited strong Catholic opposition. Clearly Mr. Johnson has sniffed a change in the direction of the wind and plans to act accordingly.

To be sure, there has been some Catholic opposition to the President's intention as expressed in the state of the Union message. Msgr. John C. Knott, of the Family Life Bureau of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, felt compelled to deny that the church has changed its position on the immorality of artificial contraception and to recall the 1959 statement of the American bishops, which said that "Catholics will not support any public assistance, either at home or abroad, to promote artificial birth prevention." There is little reason to think that the bishops have changed their position on this point. But then neither can it be doubted that Catholics have become far less vocal in their opposition; not support, but tacit acceptance is probably now the prevailing mood. Monsignor Knott also derided the expression "population explosion" as unscientific. Many demographers would agree with him on this semantic point, but there are very few who would accept his judgment that any prediction beyond the next 10 years is pure speculation. And there are very few who feel that the present generation can afford to ignore the present projections, however subject they may be to unforeseeable changes.

There will be no short cuts to a decent standard of living for this generation and those to come. A reduction of population growth, no matter what means are employed, cannot be accomplished overnight. Nor would such a reduction, taken by itself, solve the vast economic and educational problems facing the underdeveloped nations. For all that, there is an urgent need for research and for the coordination of all those groups and nations concerned with population. The President proposes to throw more Federal resources behind these needs. It is hard to see how he can do otherwise; and it becomes increasingly hard to see on what grounds Catholics can oppose his decision.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, will the Senator from Alaska yield?

Mr. GRUENING. I yield with pleasure to my friend the Senator from Texas.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. I desire to commend the distinguished Senator from Alaska for the able speech he is making, for the information he is bringing to the Senate, and for the thoughts he is advancing.

Mr. President, I believe that the problem which the Senator from Alaska has touched on is at the bottom of the reason for so much poverty on this earth. Populations all over the world are outracing the growth of their industrial resources. In South America, I know that there are some populations which are increasing at the rate of 5 percent a year. As the population growth increases, the per capita average will be lower and lower and lower each year. Consequently, unless something is done about population growth through intelligent methods to solve the economic ills of the world, I can see nothing but trouble ahead for the human race.

The Senator from Alaska is making a most intelligent, perceptive, and enlightening speech, and I hope that it will be read all over America. I congratulate him for his leadership on this problem.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my name may be added as a cosponsor on the bill with the other Senators whose names the Senator from Alaska has read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. GRUENING. I thank my friend, the Senator from Texas [Mr. YARBOROUGH], for his valuable assistance, and for his not unexpected remarks, which are always in the public interest, as I have listened to them in the 6 years I have been fortunate enough to be in the Senate with him.

Mr. YARBOROUGH. The Senator is very kind and I thank him for his comment.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GRUENING. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Maryland.

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from Alaska for his forthright statement and his courage in a field which has far too long been declared to be politically taboo; namely, the field of population control. I question what will happen to our way of life if we do not face realistically the problem of the population explosion. I invite the attention of every Senator to the problems we face with respect to crime and social unrest in our great urban areas, in particular the problem of juvenile delinquency.

Time and time again we have been faced with the situation of a young boy, technically a juvenile, that is, one under the age of 18, who becomes delinquent, and we seek to find the reason for his delinquency. When we look back in the record, we often find that the youngster has no recollection of having had a father, or that he grew up in surroundings in which he was not wanted, or in a family where he was one of many children who were not wanted.

To be specific, several weeks ago I was making a study tour through the District of Columbia Receiving Home for Children. I talked with some persons in the home about a young boy who was a

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truant. The boy had been absent from school a great many times. When he was in school, time after time his teacher would notice that the boy was sleeping in class.

A study of the case showed that the little boy was the eighth child in a family with no father. There was only one bed for all eight children. The boy, the youngest boy in the family, was forced to sleep on the edge of the bed, and every so often, all during the night, he would be bumped off onto the floor.

The problem of population control relates directly to the problems of our great cities, our slums, our rootlessness, our social disorganization, our juvenile delinquency.

Recently the New York City Youth Board decided to test the basic philosophy of the Glueck Social Prediction Table. They wished to test how closely related the juvenile delinquency rate was to the factor of a stable family life, whether a child enjoys the affection and supervision of a father and a mother, and particularly a father. They made an exhaustive comparative study of 500 delinquent and nondelinquent boys. It was an interesting study, conducted over a long period of time.

In one area, the Bronx, which is a constituency of the distinguished junior Senator from New York [Mr. KENNEDY], young boys were studied as they enter the first grade and they were studied all the way up to the time they reach the age of 18. Predictions were made as to what would happen to those young boys, in the area of delinquency or the commission of crime, based upon the social environment or the background of a boy as he entered the first grade. The results bear out the point which I believe the distinguished Senator from Alaska and many other Senators have tried to make, namely, that when there comes into the world a child who is not wanted and who is not planned for, serious trouble and social unrest are invited. One particular case which I should like to discuss involved a little boy who was called by the name of Dennis James—though, as with other case histories, the name is fictitious. Dennis was given no chance for survival based upon the social factors of his environment. The social factors basically were whether or not the boy had a stable family life, whether or not he had a mother and a father who loved him and gave him affection, and discipline, things which every child needs, and deserves.

I should like to read for the RECORD a portion of that case study as it was reported in the New York Times magazine of January 31, 1965, in an article by Mr. Julius Horwitz, because I think the facts stated speak louder than words. We are referring now to the youngster whose name, for the sake of the article, is Dennis James. Mr. Horwitz stated:

His first year of school started with a prophetic boom, for nothing in his existence had prepared him to accept school, to feel that school was important. This is his teacher's observation in the first grade: Dennis' behavior is impossible. He is a terrible fighter. He does not work. He can't sit with the rest of the class. He can't be put in line with another child. He seems to

resent being told what to do. He just looks at his teacher with a blank stare.

Why should a 6-year-old boy look at his teacher with a blank stare in the wonder world of polished desks, books, a green-tinted blackboard, chalk, crayons, a record player, the scrubbed faces of other children?

This is what the caseworkers reported: Dennis never saw his father. He vanished before he was born. Dennis never asked about his father. He doesn't know what a father is. The mother works. Dennis is supervised by a 67-year-old woman in the south Bronx. The mother works in a bakery. Dennis is more affectionate toward his mother than she is to him. What is the cohesion in the home? There appears to be no yelling or screaming. What marks did Dennis get on the social prediction table? Supervision by mother, 57.5, discipline by mother, 82.9; cohesion of the family, 61.3; total, 201.7; or an 89.2 probability of becoming delinquent.

Why is there no rating for the father?

In this instance, as in so many other instances, the father is only the inpregnator. He vanishes. He wants no responsibility for his acts. He is never around to give his little boy a Bible, to buy him an ice cream cone, to take him to the zoo, to tell him what is right or wrong, or to give him any guidance, any love.

The differences in the accuracy of the predictions of nondelinquency, because of a stable family life as between the white and the colored children were most interesting. The predictions were 100 percent accurate with relation to the white children and only 93 percent accurate with relation to the Negroes. It was interesting to note that in relation to cases in which the predictions were not accurate with respect to the colored children, in three of those cases it was because a grandmother moved in and saved the child from the probable consequences of being rejected at an early age.

The problem of population control, family planning, and the giving of information and knowledge to people hits home in the United States. We do not have to go to Europe, to South America, or to Asia or Africa; we see it here in the heart of any of our great cities.

I commend the distinguished Senator from Alaska for his fights in this area. He is making great progress. I believe there are changes. I hope that before long we shall have a complete recognition of the responsibility to give out family planning information and to help particularly our own people who are ignorant, and who do not even realize in many areas and in many cases the facts of life insofar as the reproduction of the species is concerned. I am hopeful that before too many months go by we shall face up to the problem realistically and make some real progress in this area in our own great cities with respect to the problems of social unrest, slums, juvenile delinquency, and related areas.

Mr. GRUENING. I thank my friend the junior Senator from Maryland for his very valuable contribution to this discussion. He has introduced the human factor, the personal factor, the specific case, the individual tragedy, which is so closely related to the whole problem. I welcome his assistance in a good

cause. He is a cosponsor of the bill. He was one of the first persons who came to me when I was discussing the subject and said he wanted to cosponsor the bill. He has given a great deal of thought to this field. His assistance is most valuable, and I am very grateful to him.

I am hopeful that we may hold hearings on the proposed legislation, and that we may get favorable action on it during the 89th Congress.

## THE MESS IN VIETNAM—IX

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the Saturday Evening Post is admittedly a magazine with conservative or perhaps middle-of-the-road leanings and reflects the moderate views of great numbers of our fellow Americans. All the more interesting then and significant that in its current issue—that of March 27—it carries a most revealing article on the mess in Vietnam entitled "Vietnam: Where Do We Go From Here?" by Stanley Karnow. Its subtitle says:

More and more Americans are being killed, and almost every battle plan has been tried.

While this article is factual, it reveals most tellingly what confusion and folly are being compounded incidental to our military presence there.

The article concludes with the sentence:

And a weary young American diplomat told me, "I'm all mixed up. We work a 12-hour day, go home to a couple of drinks and ask ourselves—what the hell are we doing here?"

That is perhaps as pertinent a question as is being asked today. Why are we there? We are there because of an unhappy folly bequeathed us beginning with John Foster Dulles, whose role as Secretary of State was in many respects disastrous, and because subsequently two Presidents, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, have unfortunately taken the mistaken advice of Secretary McNamara and other war hawks and have gotten us into a tragic mess, the solution of which becomes daily more difficult.

We should never have gone into South Vietnam in the first place, after the French defeat with its 175,000 casualties. We should never have stayed in, and we should now, as I have urged, and as has the distinguished senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], for over a year, make every effort to wage peace as actively as we have waged war. We have violated section 33 of the United Nations Charter. We supported, in violation of the 1954 agreement, the refusal of the South Vietnam Government to hold the elections scheduled for 1956. We should withdraw on as honorable terms as possible, but withdraw we should, as far as our military activities are concerned. Our security is in nowise imperiled by what happens in Vietnam. Only if it were would our military involvement be justified.

The war in Vietnam will never be won by military means. It is a civil war in which we have, regrettably, taken the least popular side, have installed and

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supported puppet governments with little popular support, and, in consequence of the intensification and escalation of military action, have brought about the death of over 300 Americans and countless Vietnamese, including women and children. We have now made it our war, abandoning the earlier premise that we were there merely to help South Vietnam maintain its independence.

I ask unanimous consent that the article from the Saturday Evening Post, entitled "Vietnam: Where Do We Go From Here?" be printed at this point in my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY of New York in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I likewise ask unanimous consent that an excellent article entitled "War With China: Why U.S. Policy in Asia Is Wrong," by Hans J. Morgenthau, the noted political scientist who is director of the Center for the Study of American Foreign and Military Policy at the University of Chicago, be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

#### EXHIBIT 1

VIETNAM: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?  
MORE AND MORE AMERICANS ARE BEING KILLED,  
AND ALMOST EVERY BATTLE PLAN HAS BEEN  
TRIED. AT THE CENTER OF THE CHAOS STANDS  
AN EXTRAORDINARY U.S. AMBASSADOR  
(By Stanley Karnow)

Some of the children wore jungle camouflage uniforms, and some held dolls, and all of them had name tags tied to their clothes. One boy, with shaggy hair and a rumpled sport shirt and a bewildered look in his eyes, carried a large Chinese junk under his arm. Shepherding them aboard the waiting aircraft at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut Airport were the mothers with hastily wrapped bundles and packs of spare diapers. These were the 1,819 dependents of American officials and soldiers, being evacuated from South Vietnam last month in an emergency airlift that President Johnson called "clearing the decks." One of them, 13-year-old Stephen Sutherland, was typically cool about the operation. "Life," he said as he boarded a plane for Hong Kong, "just isn't going to be adventurous any more."

The evacuation clearly marked the beginning of a new phase in the long and ugly war in Vietnam. For months, indeed years, the United States had been failing to win a war it had pledged to win. Despite about 25,000 American troops serving as advisers to the 200,000-man Vietnamese army, despite U.S. aid and supplies, despite unchallenged control of the sea and skies, increasingly large areas of Vietnam had fallen to the Communist Vietcong guerrillas. As a time of decision seemed to near, Russia's new Premier Aleksei Kosygin flew into the North Vietnamese capital of Hanoi—just as President Johnson's chief security aid, McGeorge Bundy, was visiting Saigon. But if there was any hope that these high-level visits heralded a negotiated settlement, those hopes ended in a crash of explosives—a Vietcong raid that killed eight Americans near Pleiku; American retaliation with a bombing strike in North Vietnam; another Vietcong attack that killed 20 GI's, and yet another American bombing.

The unexpected raids on North Vietnam easily achieved their military goals, but, as one U.S. general put it, "you cannot solve

South Vietnam's problems outside its boundaries." And across the world the danger of a bigger war brought new appeals for a settlement. Pope Paul warned that "the hour is grave," and pleaded that "innocent populations be spared," while U.N. Secretary General U Thant appealed to both sides to move "from the field of battle to the conference table."

In this continuing dilemma of how to win or end the Vietnamese war, the American most intricately involved is a tall graying officer who combines the unique qualifications of combat hero, scholar, experienced negotiator, and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Yet when he gave up the Nation's top military job to become U.S. ambassador to Saigon 9 months ago, Gen. Maxwell Davenport Taylor knew that the problem confronting him was nearly insoluble. He remarked rather wistfully, "I am expendable."

Taylor's appointment was almost preordained, for Taylor himself played a large part in planning the present American strategy in Vietnam. Originally he had been one of General Eisenhower's most daring combat commanders. He parachuted into Normandy at dawn on D-day, the first American general to fight in France. In Italy he slipped behind enemy lines on an intelligence mission to Rome—running risks that were, Eisenhower wrote afterward, "greater than I asked any other agent or emissary to undertake during the war." As U.S. Army Chief of Staff, however, Taylor fought President Eisenhower's plan to reduce Army strength and to rely primarily on nuclear weapons. Resigning in 1959, he wrote "The Uncertain Trumpet," outlining the strategy of "flexible response" as an alternative to "massive retaliation." His thesis attracted John F. Kennedy, as did Taylor's impressive scholarship. The Pentagon, after all, boasts precious few generals who subscribe to the Berlin "Tagespiegel" and Paris "Le Figaro," or read Greek tragedies in the original for relaxation.

Following Kennedy's election, Taylor became his special military adviser, and in late 1961 he went out to Vietnam to assess the growing Communist insurgency there. Taylor saw that routine police operations were doomed to fail. He recommended a broad military, economic, and political counterinsurgency drive, to be sustained by U.S. money and weapons, thousands of advisers and hundreds of American-piloted helicopters to make the Vietnamese Army mobile. And with this program—a winning program, official publicists called it—the United States made its large-scale plunge into Vietnam.

The U.S. mission in Vietnam today is the most formidable American "peacetime" establishment ever assembled abroad. As his deputy, Taylor has no less a figure than Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, an unruffled Far East veteran who ranks fourth in the State Department hierarchy. Taylor's military executive is a rugged, gung-ho combat officer, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, former superintendent of West Point and, at 50, the second youngest four-star general in the U.S. Army.

Taylor's operation covers an extraordinary range. There are Vietnamese-speaking analysts of Communist tactics, and experts in pig breeding, well digging, housing, and hygiene. There are surgeons and schoolteachers, accountants, mechanics and even disc jockeys, to keep up morale. Ordnance technicians are testing such esoteric weapons as high-velocity Armalite rifles, weird needle-bombs and infrared cameras that peer through camouflage. Undercover operatives staff a dozen secret networks with James Bond labels like Sniat, for special military intelligence, or the apparently innocuous central registry detachment, which supposedly spies on spies.

The United States pours almost \$2 million a day into this effort. It takes the shape of aircraft, tanks, guns, and ammunition. It

also finances imports of medicine, milk, gasoline and other products, sold locally to raise the cash that pays South Vietnamese officials and an armed force now expanding to 600,000 men. As one American economist puts it: "The war is Vietnam's biggest dollar-earner." Nor is there, on public record at least, any end to U.S. aid. When he arrived in Saigon in early July, Taylor told Vietnamese officials, "I'm here to assure you of our unstinting support. There is no time limit in that commitment."

But doses of American money, equipment, know-how, gallantry—and blood—have not arrested Vietnam's steady slide downward. On the contrary, Communist rebels are stronger, more pervasive than ever, while the country's leadership fragments in a despairing confusion of internecine rivalries. Factions of politicians, army officers, students, Buddhists, Catholics and others, seemingly unconcerned with the Vietcong threat at their gates, whirl in a chaos of intrigue and violence.

If there was ever the chance for a fresh start in Vietnam, it was after the collapse of the regime of the dictatorial President Ngo Dinh Diem (the Post, Dec. 21-28, 1963). But the inexperienced military leaders who overthrew Diem had no positive plan for running the country or winning the war. And the United States, maintaining a hands-off policy toward Vietnam politics, made no strenuous attempt to manage or coach them. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, for example, did little more than persuade Gen. Duong Van Minh, the reluctant chief of state, to deliver some public speeches.

Nor could American officials keep up with Vietnamese political maneuvers. Late in January 1964, when a goateed young field commander named Gen. Nguyen Khanh turned up in Saigon, rumors spread that he would stage another coup d'etat. But his American military adviser, a colonel, reassured the U.S. Embassy that Khanh was merely visiting his dentist.

A couple of nights later, however, Khanh telephoned Ambassador Lodge to announce that he was indeed staging a coup in 3 hours. "What could we do?" recalls a U.S. diplomat involved in that hectic night. "If we'd tried to stop him and then he succeeded, we'd have been in the doghouse. So we just went along with him."

Like Diem in previous years, Khanh became "our boy." Washington set out to bulwark him with more money, equipment, and manpower. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara took him on a barnstorming tour. Indeed, so much depended on him that McNamara said, "If Khanh goes, the United States will need a new Secretary of Defense."

It was largely to hearten Khanh, too, that President Johnson picked America's top general as ambassador when Lodge decided to join the presidential campaign at home. As originally conceived, Taylor's task was to "hold the fort" in Saigon until after the U.S. elections, then turn it over to Deputy Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson.

Taylor's relationship with General Khanh started coolly, however, and soon degenerated into undisguised hostility. Status and age divided them. Taylor was a general when Khanh was still in high school. Until a short while before, Taylor had managed the world's greatest arsenal. He wears 10 rows of ribbons, testimony to a brilliant war record. Khanh was a soldier in the French colonial army that lost a war fighting against Khanh's own people.

Their dissonant personalities aggravated the difficulty. Taylor, fashioned by 40 years of Army life, leans to formality; Khanh is gregarious, talkative, vain. Taylor's aloofness congealed Khanh as much as Khanh's swaggered repelled Taylor. They settled into addressing each other as "your excellency," and Khanh once quipped, "Ambassador Tay-



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lor is so much older than I am that we can't twist together."

The relations between them were further frayed by apparent contradictions in U.S. aims. Taylor's first serious clash with Khanh, last July, arose over the issue of escalating the war into North Vietnam. For months Washington had repeatedly hinted at enlarging the conflict. President Johnson warned Hanoi against playing "a deeply dangerous game," and U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Curtis Le May declared that "we're swatting flies when we should go after the manure pile." When Khanh made similar statements to a Saigon crowd, however, Taylor clamped down on him in several terse talks. His honor bruised, Khanh retreated, muttering that Vietnam was "independent" and "free in its actions."

Somewhat later, when Khanh tried to create a dictatorship, Taylor assented, saying he favored moves "to strengthen the government. . . ." But after Khanh's attempt resulted in bloody riots, Taylor confided to Washington reporters that Khanh "is a very impetuous young man (who) frequently has overshot his capabilities . . . in the political field."

Khanh eventually yielded to a civilian government but kept control of the army. Yet his bitterness toward Taylor persisted. Predictably, the Khanh-Taylor tensions erupted again in a full-scale crisis in late December.

With surreptitious skill, Khanh had mobilized a group of young officers into dissolving the High National Council, a shaky pillar of the latest civilian regime. This time Taylor dropped all avuncular pretense and turned back into a four-star general. He summoned the young Vietnamese soldiers to his office and berated them. Then, in an angry conversation, he flatly told Khanh to leave the country.

Khanh riposted with equal fury. He accused Taylor of meddling in Vietnam's internal affairs, adding, "If he does not act more intelligently, the United States will lose southeast Asia and we will lose our freedom."

Eventually, Vietnamese and American officials patched up a compromise of sorts, but it brought no stable government to Saigon. At one point Khanh staged another coup (the fourth in the 15 months since Diem's downfall). But no sooner had Khanh installed a new cabinet of his own choice (the ninth post-Diem regime) than rival officers launched another coup against Khanh. The general beat off that threat—only to find himself voted out of office by the Armed Forces Council, which also demanded that Khanh leave the country.

If Taylor had political problems, his military situation was no better. It was not for lack of American talent. The U.S. military chief, General Westmoreland, is an eagle-faced ex-Eagle Scout with superb combat credentials—"one of the best soldiers in the business," as Taylor rates him. Severe, abstemious and energetic. Westy blends epic courage with perennial self-betterment. On a jungle strip in central Vietnam recently, he sat upright and unflinching as Vietcong gunfire ripped into his light aircraft. His comment later was typically terse: "I learned a lesson about airfield security."

But U.S. advisers are baffled by the behavior of their Vietnamese wards. When rebellious Vietnamese battalions rumbled into Saigon for a coup d'etat not long ago, four American advisers went along, totally unaware that they were headed for mutiny. At the same time, a U.S. Ranger captain on an operation nearby was suddenly abandoned as his Vietnamese unit rushed off to join the revolt.

Under the ground rules, the Vietnamese need not heed U.S. counsel—and they often exercise that prerogative. Sweeping an area 35 miles north of Saigon recently, a govern-

ment battalion fell into a Vietcong ambush. Despite vigorous U.S. urging, the Vietnamese area commander declined to send help. The trapped unit fought its own way out, leaving 4 dead and 25 captured. "We argued all night, but it was like talking to a wall," an American officer recalled. "That colonel had the lines drawn on his map, and he wouldn't change them for anything."

In southern Chuong Thien Province soon after, a government infantry battalion walked into a similar Vietcong snare. Of its 300-odd men, 20 were killed and some 200 captured, an American sergeant among them. "Why were they caught?" growled a U.S. general. "Because they don't send out advance patrols or watch their rear and flanks. Of course we try to tell them. We beg, cajole, plead. We cry, we stomp, we even bring them ice cream. But we haven't succeeded."

A mood of distrust, mingled with frustration and bewilderment, gnaws at senior U.S. officials, Taylor among them. The indefinable feeling of doubt has, almost instinctively, impelled the U.S. mission to drift away from the Vietnamese, to adopt a vast, detached life of its own. For every American in the field, there are six or more in Saigon.

In part, the gigantic American headquarters was imposed by Washington, which seems to equate strength with size. But it also mirrors Taylor's own inclination for large staff setups.

Taylor observes a tight, busy schedule. He gets to his fifth-floor office at 8 a.m., lunches sparingly on a sandwich or Metrecal, and works until early evening. In contrast to Lodge's solitary, often secretive tactics, Taylor relies on his staff. He plays tennis once or twice a week with junior employees, carefully reads their memorandums, and frequently interrogates them on details.

With its accent on discipline, Taylor's Pentagon approach has also eliminated adventurous but valuable nonconformists. One tough ex-officer, who first parachuted into Vietnam during World War II, knew the Vietnamese leaders so intimately that one night last September he personally dissuaded a rebellious Vietnamese general from staging a private revolt. That initiative, along with other unconventional gestures, earned him a quick transfer to Africa. Said one of Taylor's deputies, "We don't want any Lawrences of Asia."

Like a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Taylor presides over a weekly meeting of the U.S. political, military, aid, intelligence, and information chiefs. Drawing from an agenda, this "Mission Council" may discuss ideas for, say, a new currency exchange rate, or radios to reinforce psychological warfare.

"Staff it," says Taylor if the suggestion seems plausible, and it goes to a lower echelon committee composed of different U.S. agency delegates. A week or more later the committee returns to present a prepared project for the council's verdict—or what is called "concurrence or nonconcurrence."

American concurrence is not enough, however. A Vietnamese council must also agree, and in joint sessions with U.S. representatives, it almost always does. "After that," explains an American official, "we're in the mysterious Orient. The Vietnamese come back to tell us what we want to hear—that our 'psywar' radios are converting the peasants, or they're growing giant aspidistras with our fertilizer. We never really know, but we've deluded ourselves into believing that we've accomplished something."

Cumbersome and ambiguous as it is, the whole process is further marred by intra-mural U.S. bickering. "We criticize the Vietnamese for their rivalries," says a high-ranking U.S. officer, "but our own agencies are not setting an ideal example."

Indeed, each American agency is promoting itself. The CIA handles certain paramilitary

groups that the U.S. military claims it can manage better. State Department officials question CIA intelligence evaluations, while CIA agents moan that their reports are ignored. Civilian AID operatives resent military intrusion into economic and social programs, and there is even squabbling within the military itself. American Air Force officers charge that armed U.S. Army helicopters are too fragile for attack operations. Statistics on damaged choppers, an Army colonel counters, are "deliberate lies put out by the Air Force." In chairmanlike fashion Taylor can arbitrate rivalries—until they break out again.

Back in 1961, when he first surveyed Vietnam, Taylor foresaw that his recommended counterinsurgency program "might not be sufficient." In that case, he envisaged some supplementary form of action against the Communists beyond South Vietnam's borders. But not until last fall, as Vietcong pressure mounted and the Vietnamese regime floundered, did he finally regard it as imperative to enlarge the war.

On a visit to Washington in late November, Taylor suggested two operations to President Johnson: (1) Retaliatory forays into North Vietnam for Vietcong terrorism against Americans or attacks against U.S. installations; (2) air strikes against supply lines and staging areas in Laos, possibly phasing into hits on such North Vietnamese targets as bridges and powerplants.

The President was cautious. He worried "about the consequences of getting American troops into a war with 700 million Chinese." "And when a brigadier general can walk down the street in Saigon and take over the government without firing a shot," he also said, "I don't know how much offensive we're prepared to launch."

After a full-dress review of the situation, however, President Johnson conceded in principle to limited escalation—on condition that the Vietnamese generals and politicians in Saigon stop wrangling. In his view, it made no sense to attack the north if the south wasn't stable.

Returning to Saigon, Taylor conveyed that message to the Vietnamese. The rival generals continued their intriguing. Buddhist leaders fasted to protest against what they called U.S. political interference, and students rioted, shouting, "Down with Taylor" and "Taylor go home." They rampaged through the streets of Saigon, encircling the U.S. Embassy and smashing the U.S. Information Agency's windows.

Taylor's anger at the mess was evident when a visitor asked him, "What do we do if some future Saigon government invites the United States to leave South Vietnam?" Without hesitation, Taylor answered, "We leave."

But the United States had no intention of being forced out of Saigon. And out of that determination evolved the feeling that whether or not the South Vietnamese government was stable, some kind of action would have to be taken against the north. Messages went back and forth between the U.S. Embassy in Saigon and the White House until President Johnson gradually came around and told Taylor the United States would attack the north "on the next appropriate occasion." As Taylor has since explained, "Once that decision was reached, all that was required was a circumstance that justified reprisal. The Vietcong handed us the chance at Pleiku and again at Quinhon, and every time it's handed to us again in the future we are going to hit back harder and harder and harder."

Taylor had not been given a blank check, however. His request for air strikes was significantly reinforced by the fact that McGeorge Bundy was on the scene and visited Pleiku after the attack. Caught up in the atmosphere of blood and tension, he supported Taylor's appeal to Washington. But



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it is clear that President Johnson very much wants to limit strikes on North Vietnam and avoid "a wider war."

Yet the quandary remains, a quandary for Johnson, for Taylor, and for America itself. Rarely in their history have habitually buoyant, self-confident Americans confessed to such perplexity, uncertainty and despondency. "I've found the situation here more complex than I ever visualized it would be," says General Westmoreland. "The political dimension and psychological flavor have been a revelation." And a weary young American diplomat told me, "I'm all mixed up. We work a 12-hour day, go home to a couple of drinks and ask ourselves—what the hell are we doing here?"

#### EXHIBIT 2

#### WAR WITH CHINA?—WHY U.S. POLICY IN ASIA IS WRONG

(By Hans J. Morgenthau)

It illuminates the many misunderstandings that beset our Vietnam policy that in order to criticize that policy in public one has first to justify one's right to do so. The President himself has declared such criticism to be unhelpful and even damaging. A former President has supported him, and many eminent men interviewed on television and elsewhere have at least implied that to support these policies was the only decent thing to do under the circumstances. This position is incompatible both with the principles of democracy and the requirements of sound policy formation.

The Constitution assigns to Congress the right to declare war. How can Congress discharge this function if its Members and the citizens who have elected them are precluded from discussing the merits of the issues which might lead to war? The Constitution implies that Congress has a choice in the matter of war. How can it make that choice if neither it nor the people it represents have the right to debate the issues? To say that the most momentous issues a nation must face cannot be openly and critically discussed is really tantamount to saying that democratic debate and decision do not apply to the questions of life and death and that, as far as they are concerned, the people have given carte blanche to one man.

Not only is this position at odds with the principles of democracy, but it also removes a very important corrective for governmental misjudgment. Would Great Britain have been better off if in the months preceding and following the outbreak of the Second World War Churchill had kept quiet and rallied behind Chamberlain, however disastrous he thought his policies to be? The Chamberlain government was driven out of office in the midst of war; was it the duty of the opposition to keep quiet and rally behind it? Should the German Reichstag have kept silent in 1917 instead of passing a resolution asking for a peace without annexations? The German Government of the day indeed thought so, but history showed that the parliamentary opposition had better judgment than the Government. In the years preceding Pearl Harbor, this country engaged in a great debate about the best foreign policy to follow. Did the country not benefit from this clarification of the issues and was its later unity not in good measure founded upon it?

Two main arguments are advanced in favor of the proposition that the people should rally behind the President and not criticize his Vietnamese policies. One is that only the President has all the facts and therefore only he has the right to judge. The truth is that nobody has all the facts and nobody needs them all. What both the President and his critics need and have are the relevant facts, and what they need more than any-

thing else is sound judgment. No one man can have a monopoly of that judgment. More particularly, the President cannot have it under present conditions.

It must be obvious to anyone who is acquainted with the President's principal advisers that the most powerful advice he gets seeks the extension of the war, and that it is hardly anything more than his innate good sense that has thus far prevented these advisers from carrying the day completely. The President ought to welcome, rather than regret, those voices from Congress and the public at large which give arguments and support to his sound instinct. The President would no doubt have personally an easier time of it, but only in the short run, if his Vietnamese policies were not exposed to criticism. Yet what the President must seek is not the convenience of one day but the approbation of history for all time to come. President Johnson is as conscious of his historic mission and of his place in history as any of his predecessors. Why, then, does he in this instance not practice what he knows to be right?

The answer to this question is to be found in the other argument in favor of silently rallying behind the President. It is the conception of consensus. Certainly the political health of the Nation and the effectiveness of government are greatly enhanced when the policies of the Government are supported by the great mass of the people. But consensus is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Here is one of the differences between a totalitarian and a democratic society. In the former, dissent is a moral vice and a political crime by definition and, conversely, consensus is the ultimate good. In a democracy, the ultimate standard is the soundness of policy for the support of which popular consensus is sought.

The democratic statesman is faced with an inevitable dilemma if he cannot get popular support for the sound policies he would like to pursue. He will choose the easy disastrous way out if he sacrifices sound policies on the altar of a fleeting popularity. If he chooses to pursue the policies he deems to be right against the opposition of the popular consensus, he must seek to change the consensus in favor of his policies in order to be able to pursue them. Doing this, he risks domestic political failure, but if he succeeds domestically, he will gain the immortality of a great statesman.

George Washington knew how to resolve this dilemma of democratic statesmanship. He proclaimed the neutrality of the United States in the War of the First Coalition against revolutionary France in 1793, while the popular consensus fervently wanted him to join France in that war. For weeks, crowds roamed the streets of Philadelphia clamoring for Washington's head, and John Marshall reports in his biography of Washington that if a motion for Washington's impeachment had not been tabled in Congress, it would have passed with an overwhelming majority. Yet if Washington had made consensus the ultimate yardstick of his policy, he would have gone down in history as the wrecker, not the father, of his country.

#### TWO DIFFERENT ANSWERS

A critical assessment of our involvement in Vietnam must start with the question, Why are we involved in Vietnam? Spokesmen for our Government have given two different answers. One answer is implicit in the Secretary of State's often repeated statement that our military mission in Vietnam will end when North Vietnam leaves its neighbor alone. In other words, we are in Vietnam in order to protect the independence of a sovereign state. Once that sovereignty is assured we can go home. It follows from

this position that we would not presume to control the way in which that sovereignty might be exercised. If, for instance, the Vietcong should take over the government in Saigon without support from the North or if a South Vietnamese government should come to an understanding with the North through which the country would be united under Ho Chi Minh, we would not intervene.

The other answer to our question has been most clearly formulated by the Secretary of Defense when he said on February 18 that "the choice is not simply whether to continue our efforts to keep South Vietnam free and independent but, rather, whether to continue our struggle to halt Communist expansion in Asia." It is the same answer Senator Dodd has given at length in his Senate speech of February 23. This answer is tantamount to saying that we shall oppose communism in South Vietnam or wherever else we find it in Asia, by military means if necessary. In other words, we shall contain communism in Asia, as we have contained it in Europe. Other official spokesmen, such as Undersecretary of State Ball in his speech of March 16, have expressed the same thought less concisely by defining our mission in Asia as the defense of freedom; that is, of non-Communist governments, against communism.

It is obvious that these two positions are irreconcilable. For if one takes the Secretary of State at his word, then we are engaged in a limited undertaking which could be liquidated through a negotiated settlement without too much difficulty. If Hanoi made a gesture toward noninterference in the affairs of South Vietnam, we could find a formula which would allow us to disengage ourselves from South Vietnam. If, on the other hand, one takes the Secretary of Defense at his word, then we are engaged in a global crusade against communism which we must fight wherever we find it. Consequently, there is no possibility for a negotiated settlement, and we shall stay in South Vietnam as long as communism threatens to expand in Asia; that is, indefinitely.

There can be no doubt, on the basis of external and internal evidence, that the position of the Secretary of Defense is at present in the ascendancy in our Government. It is with that position, therefore, that I am here concerned. I am emphatically opposed to it on two grounds: because of the intellectual errors from which it derives, and because of its likely consequences.

The intellectual errors of that position are two: misunderstanding of the nature of contemporary communism; misunderstanding of the policy of containment.

We are in Asia in order to contain communism. But what do we mean by communism? To answer that question we must take a critical look at the two equations that provide the implicit foundation for our Asian policies. On the one hand, we have equated communism with the power of China; on the other hand, we have equated communism anywhere in Asia with Chinese communism. Yet what has been true of the Soviet Union in Europe has proved to be true also of China in Asia: that the basic direction of her policies is determined primarily by her traditional national interests, and that communism only adds a new dynamic dimension to the means by which those policies are to be achieved. In other words, the fundamental fact in Asia is not that China has a Communist government but that she has resumed her traditional role as the predominant power in Asia. That that power has been restored under Communist auspices is the only relevant fact for our anti-Communist crusaders. Yet it is but of secondary importance to the nations of Asia which, from Japan to Pakistan, be-

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hold with awe and admiration the new Chinese power and try to come to terms with it.

The identification of Asian with Chinese communism is similarly the result of the crusading opposition to communism as a political philosophy and a way of life. Such identification is justified in philosophy and ethics, but it has no place in foreign policy. For it is an obvious fact of experience that in the conduct of our foreign policy we are not faced with one monolithic communism, but with a number of different communisms whose character is determined by the character and the interests of the particular nation embracing it. Thus we find in Asia, as elsewhere, different kinds of communism whose relations to China and the Soviet Union range all the way from complete independence to complete subservience. To treat all these communisms alike on the assumption that they are all equally subservient to either China or the Soviet Union or to both is the height of doctrinaire folly. In its intellectual debility, it is no different from the doctrinaire excesses of a vulgar Marxism which sees the capitalistic world as "a monolithic monster bent upon the destruction of communism."

Not only is such an attitude of indiscriminate hostility intellectually untenable, but it also precludes any possibility at diplomatic maneuver, subtle bargaining, and tolerable accommodation. In other words, it renders impossible the conduct of a foreign policy worth of the name. One only needs to consider in the light of such opportunities for creative diplomacy the present relations among the United States, the Soviet Union, China, North and South Vietnam in order to see how self-defeating this doctrinaire crusading attitude toward communism is. Instead of bombing North Vietnam because we don't know what else to do, we would at least have a chance at bending the situation in southeast Asia to our rationally defined interests if the President were advised by a Richelieu, a Talleyrand, a Bismarck or—why go abroad?—a Hamilton.

#### FOREIGN POLICY CURSE

Alas, the President of the United States has no such advisers. Instead, he is advised "to continue our struggle to halt Communist expansion in Asia," regardless of its character, its aims, its relevance to the interests of the United States. For such simple-minded conception of the enemy, the complexities and subtleties of diplomatic maneuver hold no promise. It needs an instrument as simple, indiscriminate, and crude as itself, and it has found such an instrument in the policy of the peripheral military containment of China. Here we are in the presence of the other intellectual error that dominates our Asian policy.

It seems to have been the curse of our foreign policy since the end of the Second World War that it has become the victim of its own success. The Marshall plan was eminently successful in Europe, and so we have fashioned a global policy of foreign aid on the assumptions of the Marshall plan. The policy of containment was eminently successful in Europe, and so we have extended it to the rest of the globe.

Yet the factors which made the policy of containment a success in Europe are present nowhere else and least of all in Asia. First, a line could be drawn across the European Continent which clearly delimited the western borders of the Soviet Empire. Second, two armies face each other across that line of demarcation, which is guaranteed symbolically by the presence of American troops and actually by the nuclear power of the United States to which the Soviet Union is vulnerable. Third, to the west of that boundary there lies an ancient civilization which was but temporarily in disarray and proved itself capable of containing Communist sub-

version. These factors add up to a threat which is primarily military in nature and to be countered primarily by military means. None of these factors are present in Asia.

The threat here is not primarily military but political in nature. Weak governments and societies are exposed to Communist subversion, which may or may not be an extension of Chinese power, as Chinese power may or may not be carried abroad by communism. Military containment has no bearing upon such a threat. Thus SEATO has been irrelevant to the expansion of Chinese influence into Indonesia and Pakistan. More particularly, China can, in the present state of her development, be hurt but not destroyed by nuclear weapons.

But even if the threat emanating from China were primarily military in nature, it could not be contained through the defense of accidentally selected local outposts at the periphery of China. For since the ascendancy of China in Asia is due primarily to its cultural and political predominance, it is futile to think that one can contain that predominance by militarily defending South Vietnam or Thailand. That Chinese predominance is as much a fact of life as is American predominance in the Western Hemisphere, and our attempts to contain Chinese predominance in Asia through local military operations is about as sensible as would be China's trying to contain the American predominance in the Western Hemisphere by committing her military forces in defense of one or the other of the Latin American countries.

Whoever wants to contain American predominance in the Western Hemisphere must strike at the very sources of American power; he must destroy that power itself. The same conclusion applies to the containment of China. Thus the policy of the peripheral military containment of China leads with logical necessity to war with China. Such a war cannot be fought with even a remote chance for success from the air and the sea; it must be fought and won where the sources of Chinese power lie, that is, on land. It must be fought as Japan tried to fight it, from 1932 to 1945, without ever coming close to winning it.

It is beside the point that all our leaders, past and present, even those who have deemed a war with China inevitable, have recoiled from the idea of sending millions of American soldiers to the mainland of Asia to fight. President Eisenhower said on February 10, 1954, that he "could conceive of no greater tragedy than for the United States to become involved in an all-out war in Indochina," and General MacArthur, in the congressional hearings concerning his dismissal and in personal conversation with President Kennedy, emphatically warned against sending American soldiers to the Asian mainland to fight China. We are here concerned not with the intentions of statesmen but with the inevitable consequences of their policies. None of the statesmen who made the fateful decisions in July and August, 1914, could have looked back in November 1918, on the European scene and said, "I planned it that way." Yet what happened in Europe during the First World War was the inevitable result of what statesmen decided at its beginning, without wanting or even imagining the consequences. As Mephistopheles said to Faust: "At the first step you are free, at the second you are a slave."

In Vietnam today, we are in the process of taking that fateful first step. At the moment of this writing, at least, our policy is still ambiguous. On the one hand, it seeks to create a position of strength from which to negotiate. There is an ominous similarity between this attempt to fashion somehow out of the wreckage of a lost war a favorable negotiating position, and the French policies leading to the surrender at Dienbienphu.

General Navarre's last offensive also sought to establish favorable conditions for a negotiated French withdrawal, and the concentration of the French forces in strong points like Dienbienphu was to serve the protection of those armed forces from uncontrollable guerrilla actions. Is Danang destined to become the American Dienbienphu? And if it is, shall we follow the French example and withdraw, or shall we go forward until we encounter China? It is here that the ambiguity of our present policy comes into play.

The extension of the war into North Vietnam can be interpreted as an attempt to create in Hanoi the psychological precondition for a negotiated settlement. But it can also be interpreted as an attempt to change the fortunes of war in South Vietnam by rupturing the assumed casual nexus between the policies of Hanoi and the victories of the Vietcong. This casual nexus is a delusion, which has been given the very flimsy appearance of fact through the white paper of February 28. A policy derived from such a delusion is bound to fail. Yet when it has failed and when failure approaches catastrophe, it would be consistent in terms of that delusory logic to extend the war still further. Today, we are holding Hanoi responsible for the Vietcong; tomorrow we might hold Peiping responsible for Hanoi. "At the first step you are free, at the second you are a slave."

To call attention to these implications of our present policies has nothing to do with pacifism, isolationism, appeasement, and softness on communism. The difference between calling attention to these implications now, when we have still the freedom of choice, and of stumbling unawares deeper and deeper into a morass from which there is no retreat, is the difference between prudence and recklessness; between a rational, discriminating understanding of the hierarchy of national interests and the power available for their support, and a doctrinaire emotionalism which drowns all vital distinctions in the fervor of the anti-Communist crusade.

France owes more to Mendes-France who liquidated the Indochinese War, and to De Gaulle who stopped the fighting in Algeria, than to those who wanted to continue fighting without regard for the limits of their country's interests and power. Those few who warned Athens against the Sicilian expedition, which was to become the grave of Athens' greatness, were better patriots than its promoters. To point to the likely consequences of present policy is, then, not only a right, which ought not to require apologetic assertion, but it is also a duty, burdensome yet inescapable.

#### COOPERATION BETWEEN AGENCY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CREDIT UNION NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, January 1965 marked the beginning of the fourth year of cooperation between the Agency for International Development and CUNA International, the worldwide association of credit unions, formerly known as Credit Union National Association. Many of my colleagues in the Senate know of the accomplishments of credit unions in the United States. In my own State, there are well over 300 credit unions, with some 215,000 members, providing the traditional facilities of a safe place to save and a low-cost source of loans.

The rapid growth of credit unions in the United States is now being matched

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Mr. Speaker, I urge our colleagues to read this cogent analysis:

[From the New York Times, Mar. 31, 1965]

## END OF CHEAP FARM LABOR

Secretary of Labor Wirtz sharply reflected the expressed intention of Congress when he told importunate corporate farmers that they could never again expect Government authorization for the mass import of cut-rate foreign labor to harvest American crops.

No crops will spoil if the growers finally face up to the need for a substantial increase in the wages that have for so many years made migratory farm laborers the country's most exploited workers. Their average earnings have never come to much more than \$1,000 a year—a third of the level President Johnson has taken as the dividing line between poverty and decency.

Even a doubling of farm wages should mean little in costs to consumers. A recent survey by the Labor Department found that the field labor cost for picking oranges was 1 to 2 cents a dozen, as against a retail price of 50 to 72 cents at big city markets. For lettuce the picking cost was a little over 1 cent a head, the retail sales price 23 cents. The farm laborer can move far up the economic ladder without any profound impact on the pocketbook of this best fed of nations.

## PROHIBITION OF COMMERCE WITH NORTH VIETNAM

(Mr. POOL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. POOL. Mr. Speaker, men in their greed seldom consider the far-reaching consequences of their avaricious deeds. Time and again they see fit to profit through maritime trade in time of war. It happened during the world wars, it happened during the Cuban crisis, and such is also the case in North Vietnam. Many of our staunch allies are sending ships into North Vietnam while our forces are struggling to maintain a vestige of democracy in the south of that nation.

And not only are these foreign ships profiteering at the expense of our military effort and the American merchant marine, but they are doing so with American goods in some instances. I am today proposing legislation to amend the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 in order to prohibit transportation of articles by foreign vessels who engage in commerce with the Communist dominated nation of North Vietnam.

This law will not force the cessation of such base conduct on the part of our allies—that is beyond our legislative power—but at least it will focus attention upon this problem, this gross disloyalty to the cause of liberty permitted to private citizens by their governments. Even though this commerce may mean little at present to the economy of North Vietnam, the far-reaching consequences of greedy men may eventually contribute to the loss of liberty by entire nations.

## RACIAL DEMONSTRATIONS IN ALABAMA COMMUNIST INSPIRED

(Mr. DICKINSON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Speaker, on Tuesday of this week I spoke in this Chamber on the recent Communist-inspired racial disturbances in my State. I mentioned that Martin Luther King has been and continues to be surrounded by Communists and Communist sympathizers.

In yesterday's Washington Daily News, on the same page on which there was an account of my remarks, Mr. Ted Knap, a Scripps-Howard staff writer, reported the following:

## INVESTIGATORS SAY: REDS BORE INTO RIGHTS MOVEMENT

(By Ted Knap, Scripps-Howard staff writer)

Government investigators confirmed today that there is some Communist infiltration of the civil rights movement.

As to the extent of this infiltration, informed sources in the Justice Department, Senate and House agree:

It is more prevalent in the organizations of militant young Negroes than the larger, mature civil rights groups.

It is "substantial," though not to the extent of taking over the movement, or even coming close.

It is effective in inciting situations which hurt the United States when propagandized overseas, particularly in Africa.

## CONGRESS

The question of Communist infiltration in the civil rights movement was raised yesterday in Congress. Chairman EDWIN E. WILLIS, Democrat, of Louisiana, of the House Un-American Activities Committee, in announcing an investigation of the Ku Klux Klan, said "Communist influence" is also involved.

The committee has traced Communist agitation among Negroes back to the late twenties, when Stalin decreed that the Communist Party, U.S.A., was to organize a Negro government in the South that would secede from the Nation.

In 1959, Khrushchev switched to a line of "full integration" for the Negro and Communists were urged to infiltrate Negro groups.

Here's how the Government sources described Communist penetration of the main civil rights organizations:

Urban League: "Always has been clean."

NAACP: "Kicked them out years ago."

Southern Christian Leadership Conference: "Martin Luther King discourages them; kicked out one Communist who had been an SCLC leader."

CORE: "Fairly clean. Jim Farmer won't tolerate them, but there are some Communists in lower echelons."

Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee: "Irresponsible \* \* \* allows Communists."

Freedom Now Party: "Welcomes Communists."

Muslims and Black Nationalist: "Welcome Communists, particularly of the Chinese line. Small in number."

The Government officials expressed concern about fringe groups that latch onto the civil rights movement as an excuse to agitate.

They mentioned the Progressive Labor Movement, whose members regard Russian communism as bourgeois, and W. E. B. Dubois Clubs, Trotskyite groups springing up on college campuses. PLM leaders were active in the Harlem riots last summer.

As the article states, sources within the U.S. Government describe the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee as "Irresponsible \* \* \* allows Communists."

Mr. Speaker, last Thursday, at the end of the march on Montgomery, the Reverend Ralph Abernathy, first lieutenant to Martin Luther King, stated on na-

tional television while appealing for additional funds to finance more demonstrations:

Bring your contributions by the table up here before you leave or send them to the office of the SCLC (Southern Christian Leadership Conference) at 714 Auburn Avenue NE., Atlanta, Ga.; or send them to the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee in Atlanta. Either way, it will go to the movement.

Mr. Speaker, this is just one more admitted link between the racial troubles in Alabama, Martin Luther King, and the Communist Party. This proves beyond doubt that the money received goes to a common pot, and that there is really no difference in SNCC and "King" Martin Luther's Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

## MISSISSIPPI RIVER RECREATIONAL AREA

(Mr. HUNGATE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and to include an editorial.)

Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Speaker, I should like to call the attention of the House to an editorial written by Art Higgins, editor of the Quincy Herald-Whig, Quincy, Ill., on March 21, 1965. He urges completion of a Mississippi River Recreational Area plan originally introduced by my predecessor, the late Clarence Cannon. I think the points he makes, in favor of such an overall federally established park, are well taken; and under the leadership of our present great Secretary of the Interior, Stewart Udall, such a program would be of great benefit to our entire Nation.

For 20 years, the 10 States bordering the Mississippi River have been actively seeking creation of a national parkway along the shores of the Nation's greatest river.

Still, when the parks for America program was set up this year, the river playground was omitted.

Other projects, numbering 12, are newer and each would serve fewer persons within 1 day's journey or less.

The Mississippi plan was introduced in Congress by the late Representative Clarence Cannon two decades ago. A national parks study was ordered. Preliminary plans followed a report on the study. But the job of procuring land and building roads was left to the several States.

Some progress has been made in some States, but there has been little coordination. With 10 States involved, it is clear only the Federal Government can accomplish the job within the span of the present generation.

Further, if each State is to develop the parkway in its own way, there will be 10 different types of facilities. Yet the hope is to provide a playground from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, along the great river and through some of the most scenic territory in the United States.

The park expansion plan is worthy. It is long overdue. Not since the days of Gifford Pinchot has there been real enthusiasm in the Federal parks program. And since that time our national population has doubled.

Vacation travel has grown much more rapidly than has the population. When Pinchot and Theodore Roosevelt envisioned playgrounds in our vast public domain, only a few thousand persons annually traveled to the Nation's scenic spots on annual vacations. Now, almost everyone has a vacation,

and many millions each year take trips of from 1 to 6 weeks or more and travel from a few hundreds to 20,000 miles or more. The number of visitors to the country's famous scenic areas doubles each 3 or 4 years.

Of the 12 proposed new park areas 7 are in the West or Southwest, 3 are in the East and only 2 are in the Middle West. The greatest number of new parks thus will be in the least populous areas.

Of the two projected midwestern parks, one is in Michigan and the other in northern Indiana, on the shore of Lake Michigan.

Nothing is planned for the immediate Mississippi Valley, perhaps the most interesting part of Middle America.

The great river road, the highway that will serve the parkway, has been marked through Illinois and some other States. But, with some exceptions, it leads to nothing. The heart of the program is the recreational development in a vast parkway system. There were to be access points to the river, beaches, boating facilities, picnicking and outdoor sports facilities.

Few of these now are available. Only the Congress can bring order and action to the Mississippi River parkway plan.

It is not too late to include it in the new program.

#### VICTIMS OF AUTO ACCIDENTS

Mr. HUNGATE asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Speaker, I should like to call the attention of the House to a matter of great concern to all Americans and particularly those who operate or ride in motor vehicles. The tragic victims of accidents on our highways are now suffering a flank attack. I respectfully call attention to two articles printed side by side on page A22 of the Washington Post, Sunday, February 28, 1965. One calls attention in headlines to the "Tragic Decline in Moral Values" and assails "A Rise in Fake Claims." The article continues:

"Fraudulent and padded claims likewise increased in 1964," top Geico executives said. "The industry continues to be mulcted by the small but tremendously costly minority of policyholders, claimants, and garage owners who present exaggerated or fraudulent claims, in some cases with the aid of doctors and lawyers who sully the ethics of their honorable professions by abetting or even instigating these malpractices."

"It is unfortunate that, despite the efforts of our industry and the educational articles printed by many great newspapers, the general public is still not aware of the fact that these unscrupulous practices penalize all persons who buy insurance by contributing to the need for higher insurance rates. It is the responsibility of all citizens, and particularly the ethical practice committees of the great professions, to help stamp out these evils."

It also assails "excessive jury awards in personal jury suits," although one would assume that any jury award which was truly excessive would be reversed by the appellate court. The broadside slant at the medical and legal professions is unencumbered by specific facts, names, and supporting evidence. The plethora of comparisons on increasing costs of claims contains no statement of the increases occurring in automobile

prices, repair bills, living expenses, or doctor and hospital bills, in the same period of time covered by the report.

One can only be thankful that the Washington Post makeup man had a keen sense of humor and placed alongside the article another one on the same company complaining of a decrease in earnings because of poor underwriting results in the auto casualty insurance field.

Automobile accident victims are seeking and obtaining relief in such numbers that last year the Geico net earnings after taxes were a mere \$6.2 million or \$1.93 a share as compared to \$6.6 million or \$2.5 a share in the preceding year. The company's underwriting profit last year was \$3.7 million as opposed to \$6.1 million underwriting profits the preceding year. Total company assets increased 16 percent last year to \$171.8 million. Net investment income before taxes increased 8.2 percent to \$4.3 million.

In view of such profitable conditions, after taxes, and the tragic decline the company finds in our moral values and standards of ethical conduct, you might expect the annual report to indicate premium reductions to set the proper tone for leadership in ethical standards and/or a report of substantial contributions to research foundations, medical and legal professional groups to eradicate aberrant miscreants. Not so.

The 1965 outlook is highly favorable according to Geico's annual report. Its president says 1965 should bring further premium rate increases in numerous States which will improve underwriting profits. They predict that Geico premium income and the number of policyholders will set new records, that investment income will increase 25 percent.

The National Association of Claimants Compensation Attorneys, the Missouri Association of Claimants Compensation Attorneys, and such leaders of the bar as J. E. Clarke, attorney of Elsberry, Mo., a director of that association, will remind this body and the American public that not only are they the ones who must bear the costs of increased auto insurance premiums but on any given day they may find themselves the tragic victims of such an automobile accident and should recall that living expenses, doctor, hospital, and garage bills cannot be paid with homilies.

#### UDALL BILL TO PROVIDE FOR CERTAIN REORGANIZATIONS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

(Mr. UDALL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous material.)

Mr. UDALL. Mr. Speaker, today I introduced a bill to reorganize certain functions in the Department of State and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in order to bring about better coordination of activities con-

cerned with population growth in this country and abroad.

The bill also provides for a January 1967 White House Conference on Population and assistance to States which want to hold conferences prior to the national gathering.

A similar bill is being introduced in the Senate, cosponsored by Senators GRUENING, BASS, McGOVERN, TYDINGS, and others.

Earlier this year I introduced House Concurrent Resolution 56, requesting appointment of a Presidential Commission on Population. The resolution is patterned after the one introduced in the 88th Congress jointly by Senators GRUENING and CLARK, both of whom have given fearless and pioneering leadership in this field.

Today's bill is aimed at improving coordination of presently authorized population programs within the two Departments named and to encourage dialog on the issue.

In his state of the Union message, the President gave new and bold stimulation to the discussion of a problem which most everyone recognizes exists. This one sentence may have been one of the most significant statements issued by a President. He said:

I will seek new ways to use our knowledge to help deal with the explosion in world population and the growing scarcity in world resources.

With these words the President has opened the way for free and open discussion about the problems brought on by the world's population growth. Almost overnight the climate for discourse has changed. As late as last summer I had serious qualms about public reaction to a Member of Congress expressing concern with the world's burgeoning population. It was, I thought, a dangerous political topic.

But on August 10 I sent out thousands of copies of a newsletter on the subject and the immediate mail response convinced me that on this issue our citizens are not only ready but anxious to hear debate in the American tradition. People are often ahead of their leaders and I am convinced this is the case with the population explosion problem.

Mr. Speaker, I request permission to have printed at this point my August 10, 1964 newsletter entitled, "A Time Bomb Called Population."

#### A TIME BOMB CALLED POPULATION

In this presidential election year heated debate will be waged on a multitude of current and pressing problems. But conspicuously absent from issues to be discussed is the one which may well be our most urgent problem—the time bomb called population.

As Mark Twain might have put it: Population is something everybody does something about but nobody talks about. I intend to talk about it.

During a recent press conference, in discussing sharply increased school district and local taxes, I cited some startling statistics and commented that a great many of our local, national and international problems originate in one way or another in the "population explosion." When I finished, a reporter asked, "Congressman UDALL, what are you doing to help solve this problem?"